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Abstract
Robust Design of Distribution Networks Considering Worst Case
Interdictions
Alexandre Couedelo
Multi-echelon facility location models are commonly employed to design transporta-
tion systems. While they provide cost-ecient designs, they are prone to severe
nancial loss in the event of the disruption of any of its facilities. Additionally, the
recent crisis in the world motivates OR practitioners to develop models that better
integrate disruptive event in the design phase of a distribution network.
In this research, we propose a two-echelon capacitated facility location model un-
der the risk of a targeted attack, which identies the optimal location of intermediate
facilities by minimizing the weighted sum of pre and post interdiction ow cost and
the xed cost of opening intermediate facilities. The developed model results in a
tri-level Mixed Integer Programming (MIP) formulation, reformulated in a two-level
MIP. Hence, we prescribe solution methods based on Bender Decomposition as well
as two variants that enhance the speed performance of the algorithm.
The results reveal the importance of selecting backup facilities and highlight that
premium paid to design a robust distribution network is negligible given the benet
of reducing the post-interdiction cost when a disruptive event occurs.
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Disasters or intentional attack on supply chains, even though they rarely occur, may
result in signicant nancial losses due to the complexity and scale of today's logistic
networks. Multiple recent crisis emphasis the need for more studies in network dis-
ruption such as the US border and air trac shut down following the 11 September
2001 terrorist attack, which forced Ford to idle ve plants because of shortage in sup-
plies (She and Rice Jr, 2005), or more recently in 2015, after Paris terrorist attack
the transport of goods has been reduced between France, Belgium and Luxembourg
resulting in higher transportation cost in Europe (BSI, 2017)
In addition to the growing threat, today`s logistics network design methods creates
particularly vulnerable networks (Snyder et al., 2006), (Li et al., 2013). Undoubt-
edly, the just-in-time paradigm designs are cost ecient but may result in unreliable
network under interdiction of facilities or transportation arcs. Taking disruption risk
into account would be benecial, not only because it limits repercussion of operating
the network under degraded conditions, but also it leaves room for better strategic
decision as the system gains more exibility.
As a result of both the increase in recent severe disruption in supply chains af-
fecting major corporation in the world and a weakness mentioned above in network
design, studies in network disruption have gain ground within the past decade (Sny-
der et al., 2006). Those contributions are part of a more general eort put into supply
chain risk management and network reliability. The current strategy to protect a dis-
tribution system is extending fundamental problems such as the P-median problem
or the Fixed-Charge problem that focused on a location and allocation of customers
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to suppliers. Indeed, the supply chain network function is to distribute goods from
supplier to customer. However, modern networks are more complicated than the sup-
plier and customer relationship. It usually involves a sequence of facilities of dierent
types that fulll each a specic function or service to complete the manufacturing
process. Since the topology of a supply chain network dramatically inuences the
operational capabilities under a disruption, considering such risk to enhance existing
multilevel facility location model is critical.
Strategies that integrate the risk aspect into the design process are divided into
stochastic and deterministic interdiction. The rst category look at potential failure
at dierent level including machine malfunction, road closure, plant shut down. This
strategy aims to quantify the risk of interdiction through the enumeration of possible
scenarios. On the other hand, deterministic interdiction focuses on a game theory
approach where two opponents face each other. Therefore the design emerging from
this approach aims to prevent the worst-case scenario. Both techniques assure the
selection of a robust set of facility, such that an attack on the network will have little
eect on its operation. Furthermore, a robust set must necessarily be considered in
the design phase since the type of disruption in question is very sudden and would im-
mediately result in negative nancial impacts. On top of that, one may not optimally
harden/protect a facility location design by adding backup facilities later on, because
the number of facilities involved impact considerably the topology of a network.
The purpose of this thesis is to design distribution networks by considering the
network interdiction aspect at the design stage by combining network interdiction
and Multi-echelon facility location problem. While most studies considered mainly
random and single failure, we focus on multiple deterministic interdictions which cor-
respond to the worst case scenario possible in case of disruption. Furthermore to
the best of our knowledge, there is no proposed model in literature to design com-
plex supply chain under the assumption of a deterministic disruption. Therefore, we
based our model on the standard Two-echelon Capacitated Facility Location Problem
(TCFLP), in which the designer create a distribution network between supplier and
client with an intermediary storage facility, and derive a new version robust against
target attack. The enemy is assumed to have a xed budget to eliminate facilities, and
the designer is taking the potential threat into account while selecting the network
design. The formulation of this problem is generic enough to extend it to k-echelon.
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We provide algorithms based on Bender Decomposition, much as Smith et al. (2007)
solved Multi-commodities ow network design under optimal interdiction. Besides,
we explore several well-known enhancement techniques to accelerate the standard
Bender Decomposition.
This thesis focuses on the optimal selection of transshipment facilities in a hier-
archical network to minimize the design cost as well as both operating the network
under usual and worst case disruption scenario. The rest of the thesis is organized as
follows: Section 2 review the relevant literature; In Section 3 the problem statement
is presented; In Section 4 we describe the proposed solution method, which includes
a standard Bender Decomposition and two enhancement techniques; the numerical
experiments in Section 5 illustrate the managerial insights and the computational per-





In this Chapter, we present an overview of the literature for network interdiction and
Multi-Echelon Facility Location Problems (MEFLP), the two area of research that
are brought together in the present thesis. We rst look at real-world applications of
network interdiction problems that have been considered in the literature. Later, in
section 2.2 and 2.3 we expose the main contributions related to this thesis in both
network interdiction and MEFLP. This work leads us to propose a classication of
network introduction problems based on the initial model they study (e.g., ow rout-
ing, facility location, etc.) and the characteristic associated with the way potential
disruptions are introduced into the model.
2.1 Topics in Network Interdiction
In this section, we introduce the notion of network interdiction and present the topics
tackled in this eld. The selected papers highlight the most common application of
network interdiction relevant to this thesis.
A network interdiction problem involves two parties (i.e players, sides), an at-
tacker (also called leader, enemy, interdictor or adversary) and a defender (also called
follower, operator or owner). Both opponent participate to a game in which the de-
fender operate a network and therefore aim to optimize its actions such as minimizing
the operation cost, maximize the protability or service level. On the other hand, the
attacker attempt to disrupt the network such that it inicts the maximum damage
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to the defender. The two person structure of such game designated as an attacker-
defender model (defender-attacker depending on who is acting rst) result in nested
optimization problems that address simultaneously the criticality of infrastructures,
and the robustness of a network. A structure is dened as critical for a network if its
removal degrades the performances of the network signicantly. While a network is
said robust if he can fulll its function after random or deliberate disruption.
The network interdiction problem has been studied for more than sixty years
starting with the military and Homeland security concerns. For instance McMasters
and Mustin (1970) and Ghare et al. (1971) studied the best possible way to plan
an aircraft strike that interdicts the maximum ow of enemy supply. Brown et al.
(2005) designed a defensive ballistic missile network that prevents the threat of an
enemy strike. Barkley (2008) research on creating a robust IP-Network with regard to
potential interdiction on routers (nodes) and connections (arcs). Brown et al. (2009)
aim to best delay the completion of batches of nuclear weapon as long as possible
based on scheduling theory.
Later, in this area of research Wood also tackled civil-world problems such as
minimizing drug smuggling in two papers Wood (1993) and Washburn and Wood
(1995). Assimakopoulos (1987) developed a strategy to limit the propagation of
infections in hospitals. Anandalingam and Apprey (1991) used network interdiction
to help resolve water sharing conict between two nations with the intervention of an
arbitrator such as the United Nation.
2.2 Network Interdiction Problems
Table 1 provides an overview of the literature of network interdiction problems with
respect to the type of problem which can be a General model (G), Shortest Path
Problem (SPP), Maximum Flow Problem (MFP), Multi-Commodity Flow network
design (MCFP), Facility Location Problem (FLP), Multi-Echelon Facility Location
Problem (MEFLP). The also dierentiate the formulation approach which can be
either Stochastic or deterministic; the type of disruption that corresponds to the
attacker decision that is either continuous (i.e., the attacker can partially interdict an
element of the network) or discrete (i.e., the attacker remove the target entirely from
the network). Additionally, we indicate if the model integrates capacity constraint in
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the model. The designer may attempt to protect the network by using fortication
(F), to design of the network (D) or focus on the optimal attack strategy (A).
Paper Type of
model
Formulation Disruption Capa. Objective
General model (G)
Brown et al., 2006 G Det. Disc. X F
Wood, 2011 G Det. Disc. N.A. N.A.
Maximum Flow Problem (MFP)
Wollmer, 1964 MFP Det. Disc. X A
McMasters and Mustin, 1970 MFP Det. Cont. X A
Ghare et al., 1971 MFP Det. Cont. X A
Multi-Commodity Flow network design (MCFP)
Wood, 1993 MCFP Det. Disc. and Cont. X D
Washburn and Wood, 1995 MCFP Det. Disc. X N.A.
Lim and Smith, 2007 MCFP Det. Cont. X D
Smith et al., 2007 MCFP Det. Disc. and Cont. X D
Barkley, 2008 MCFP Det. Disc. X F
Azad et al., 2013 MCFP Det. Disc. and Cont. X F
Shortest Path Problem (SPP)
Fulkerson and Harding, 1977 SPP Det. Cont. X A
Israeli and Wood, 2002 SPP Det. Disc. X A
Bayrak and Bailey, 2008 SPP Det. Disc. X A
Cormican et al., 1998 SPP Sto. Disc. X A
Morton et al., 2007 SPP Sto. Disc. X A
Pan and Morton, 2008 SPP Sto. Disc. X A
Brown et al., 2009 SPP Det. Disc. X A
Facility Location Problem (FLP)
Drezner, 1987 FLP Sto. Disc. D
Bundschuh et al., 2003 FLP Sto. Disc. X D
Church et al., 2004 FLP Det. Disc. D
Snyder and Daskin, 2005 FLP Sto. Disc. D
Snyder et al., 2006 FLP Sto. Disc. X D
Li et al., 2013 FLP Sto. Disc. D
Shishebori et al., 2014 FLP Sto. Disc. D
Multi-Echelon Facility Location Problem (MEFLP)
Peng et al., 2011 MEFLP Sto. Disc. and Cont X D
An et al., 2014 MEFLP Sto. Disc. X D
Our Contribution MEFLP Det. Disc. X D
Table 1: Classication of network interdiction literature
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2.2.1 Maximum Flow Interdiction
Reducing the maximum ow has received the most attention in the deterministic
network interdiction problems. This problem extends the max ow problem (MFP)
which constitutes the basis of the multi-commodity ow problem (MCFP) used to
design transportation networks with multiple sources and sink in which the ow must
travel from adjacent nodes.
Initially, Wollmer (1964) work on a ow network design with single source and sink.
He investigates the consequences of arc interdiction while assessing the vulnerability
of an existing network. He develops an algorithm that minimizes the maximum ow
in a network by removing precisely k-arcs.
Later, McMasters and Mustin (1970) and Ghare et al. (1971) apply minimizing
the maximum ow model to transportation network represented as a planar con-
nected graph. They consider that the attacker is able to reduce arc capacity within
a restricted budget, as a result not only he decides on the target but also on the as-
sociated eort. The more eort, the more budget is allocated, the more the capacity
is reduced.
Wood (1993) generalized the integer programming formulation of deterministic
interdiction problem applied to MCFP. Unlike the previous studies, his model does
not require the network to be source-sink planar. Even thought source-sink planar
assumption allows the problem to be solved eciently via a dual-primal algorithm
it imposes a single source and a single sink located on the periphery of the network.
This assumption is not realistic for most real-life applications. Relaxing that strong
assumption let the designer select multiple sources and sink anywhere in the network.
Washburn and Wood (1995) developed a general model for network interdiction
using game theory. Their problem is modeled as a Two-player zero-sum game in which
an evader (i.e., prisoner) tries to cross a network from source to sink by minimizing the
probability of being discovered (i.e., arrested). The optimal solution to this problem
is dicult to nd, because it exists an exponentiation number of paths for the evader
can choose. However, by reformulating the problem as minimizing the maximizing
ow, then the optimal the solution may be obtained in polynomial time.
Lim and Smith (2007) formally characterize model and solution methods for multi-
commodity ow with continuous and discrete interdiction. In a discrete interdiction
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problem, the attacker decision variables can only take integer values, while in contin-
uous interdiction they can be any real value. They present two formulations for the
problem in the discrete case, and they develop exact and heuristic algorithm for the
continuous case. In a second contribution, Smith et al. (2007) tackle MCFP again,
but solve the worst-case scenario that corresponds to disruption made by an intelli-
gent enemy with full information, and also studied the attacks of an enemy with only
partial information on the network. They modeled the worst-case scenario using a
nested attacker-defender model. Attacks based on incomplete information are mod-
eled using heuristics such as targeting arc with maximum capacity or targeting arc
with maximum ow. The heuristic approaches can be easily solved using a cutting
plane algorithm that rapidly generates solutions while minimizing the impact of the
enemy strategy.
2.2.2 Shortest Path Interdiction
A second growing topic in this area of network interdiction is the shortest path inter-
diction. These models are more simplistic than MFP or MCFP; however authors on
this subject develop ecient algorithms to solve their problems, and those techniques
can be applicable to more general interdiction problems.
The rst shortest path interdiction model was introduced by Fulkerson and Hard-
ing (1977), assuming that the enemy is able the extend the length of an arc within
a constrained budget. To solve this problem, they used a reformulation of the maxi-
mum minimum-path problem into a single maximization problem by using the dual
of the inner minimum-path problem.
Israeli and Wood (2002) develop a model where the interdictor maximizes the
shortest path by removing or increasing the length of an arc by a xed amount.
Unlike Fulkerson and Harding (1977) paper the interdiction is modeled as a binary
decision (i.e., discrete interdiction) therefore reformulation technique is not possible,
instead of in that paper the authors develop an extreme point enumeration technique
based on Bender Decomposition and super-valid inequalities.
Similar studies aim to maximize the critical path Brown et al. (2009), Granata
et al., 2013 in that particular case the goal of the interdictor is to target the longest
path in the optimal schedule.
The stochastic version of the SPP interdiction problem is studied in the following
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papers Cormican et al. (1998), Morton et al. (2007), Pan and Morton (2008). for a
more detail literature review on shortest path network interdiction we refer to Sadeghi
et al. (2017).
2.2.3 Facility Location and Network Disruption
Few papers consider discrete interdiction associated with the topic of facility location
and very little tackle multi-level supply chain network design (Snyder et al., 2016).
The early literature that integrates risk management in facility location focuses on
randoms event such demand and uncertainty or machine failure.
A primary stream of the literature pursues the design of reliable supply chain.
The reliability of a network refers to its ability to fulll the demand completely even
when subject to unplanned event. On the other hand, robustness focuses on the
performance of the system under disruption; thus a solution is robust if a disruption
has little impact on its objective value. For instance, Bundschuh et al. (2003) focus
on supplier failure and presents a stochastic model that integrates both reliability and
robustness in a multi-stage single customer facility location problem.
Drezner (1987) is the rst to introduce potential disruption touching the network
itself such as facilities or transportation arc. Most studied in FL consider stochastic
interdiction represented by the probability that a facility will fail and become inactive.
Snyder and Daskin (2005) and Li et al. (2013) worked on the reliable model
for facility location and developed the reliable p-median problem (RPMP) and the
reliable uncapacitated facility location problem (RUFLP). Shishebori et al. (2014)
established reliable facility location and network design that associate each customer
with multiples facilities (backup facilities) considering the maximum allowable failure
cost; therefore it limits the increase in cost incurred during the disruption to an
acceptable loss in any circumstances.
Peng et al. (2011) work a reliable two-echelon (supplier, transshipment, customer)
network design problem based on the p-robustness approach that protects the network
against potentially unreliable transshipment facilities. An et al. (2014) introduce a
two-stage stochastic interdiction problem and formulate the objective as to minimize
the weighted sum of the operation both before and after disruption much as Smith
et al. (2007) did for MCFP.
Church et al. (2004) studies the deterministic interdiction of facilities, applied to
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a standard facility location problem, he introduces the r-interdiction median problem
which is a version of p-median problem robust against intentional strikes.
2.3 Multi-level Facility Location Problems
In this subsection, we summarize the main contribution in terms of formulation and
characteristic of the model.
Multi-echelon facility location problem (MEFLP) is a traditional problem in sup-
ply chain design. It aims to simultaneously select the required facilities in a network
(Network Design Problem) and satisfy the customer demand by assigning them to a
sequence of open facilities (Flow Routing Problem). This family of problems is also
commonly designated by the terms multi-stage, multi-level, hierarchical, multi-layer.
Those models provide a tightly optimize solution, which is often very sensitive to
disruption. Indeed the unexpected losses of critical infrastructures may substantially
impact the cost of operation and distribution of products through the network. The
best performance of the supply chain is the trade-o between the location of facilities
and allocation of customers.
Problems in facility location can be categorized based on their objective function
(Daskin, 2008). This classication denes two categories of problems (i) covering
base model, (ii) median base model that constitute the foundation for most of the
advanced models in either network interdiction models or hierarchical network mod-
els. The rst category focuses on covering the customers, by only looking at their
allocation to facilities. For instance, the Set Covering Problem (SCP) is one of the
problems in this category and has the objective of minimizing the number of facilities
required to satisfy the diniemand. The second category mainly targets the cost of
delivering a given amount of demand. The P-Median Problem (PMP) for instance
aim to minimize the demand-weighted average distance between customers and fa-
cilities (Hakimi, 1964). This category also includes Fixed-Charge Location Problem
that does not contain a limit on the number of facilities but instead has the objective
to minimize the cost of utilizing a facility (i.e., operation, construction) and the cost
of serving each customer. The uncapacitated facility location problem (UFLP) is a
well-known problem xed-charge problem (Cornuejols et al., 1983).
The location-allocation models stated before are usually too simplistic to manage
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the complete distribution channel. Indeed, to best manage a supply chain we would
like to integrate multiple types of infrastructures such as suppliers, plants, distribution
centers, customers, etc. Therefore one important extension looks at the inclusion of
multiple layers (i.e., levels) where each one of which playing a specied role. This
family of models is designated in the literature as hierarchical facility location models.
Sahin and Sural (2007) develop a classication of the research on this topic.
Facility interdiction in multi-echelon distribution networks has received scarce
attention in the literature. Therefore we want to expand this area of by tackling a
fundamental problem in the topic. The simplest MEFLP is without a doubt the two-
echelon uncapacitated facility location, which can be used to design a distribution
network with intermediate facilities (e.g., distribution center). This problem is one
of the most studied in the eld (Ortiz-Astorquiza et al., 2017). A more interesting
version is the capacitated two-echelon facility location (TCFLP) however less eort
in the litterature has been made on the capacitated case. Aardal (1992) presented an
early study on this problem and later a reformulation called the two-index formulation
(Aardal, 1998). For a detailed review of multi-level facility location problem we
refer to Melo et al. (2009) and for a more recent review focusing on the formulation
approaches we refer to Ortiz-Astorquiza et al. (2017).
2.4 Conclusion
The above literature review shows that network interdiction is a growing topic in
network operations. Even though it emerged from military concerns, authors on
the subject demonstrate its use in numerous domains, particularly, the design of
distribution network. However, we found that the literature only scratches the surface
of the problem of designing robust distribution network, and little or no work consider
the following aspects together (i) the protection against worst case scenario in facility
location; (ii) The design of complex distribution systems such as multi-echelon facility
location that reect real-world application; (iii) the interdiction of capacitated facility.
In this regard, we identify in the multi-echelon literature an initial model namely
TCFLP that would answer the aforementioned gaps in the literature if it is coupled
with the deterministic network interdiction approach. The proposed TCFLP is a ca-
pacitated model, and it addresses the design of distribution network with intermediate
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facilities which are a typical complex structure in the eld. Additionally, determinis-
tic network interdiction focuses on the study of the worst-case scenario. Finally, we
aim to develop ecient solution methods for our problem by taking inspiration from
the state of the art in determianistic network interdiction such as multi-commodity
ow interdiction and shortest path network interdiction. We compare our model to
the previous work in the literature in Table 1.
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Chapter 3
Problem Statement and Notation
The problem concerned with the best placement of infrastructures and the best allo-
cation of customers is one of the most studied topics in operation research. Indeed,
selecting the location of intermediate facilities reect a critical long-term strategic
decision for a company. Moreover, a dominant structure in transportation systems
employs multi-echelon design.
In this context, our objective is to provide a network design that minimizes the
total costs while preventing the nancial damage that could result from a disruption
aecting facilities in a network. To achieve this, we applied network interdiction
approach to a well studied hierarchical facility location problem.
In the following subsections, we rst introduce and illustrate the problem state-
ment of this research, then present the mathematical formulation that provides a
robust solution with respect to intentional attack. Finally, we oer an interpreta-
tion of the formulation to help the reader to understand its meaning and practical
implications.
3.1 Problem Description
We consider a single product supply chain design that includes a set of suppliers, a set
of intermediate facilities (e.g., distribution center, or depot), and a set of customer.
In this problem, the designer aims to construct a two-echelon distribution network
while minimizing two types of cost (i) a xed annualized setup cost related to the




Figure 1: Example of Network Design and Interdiction
the satisfaction a deterministic demand. The designer's decisions are the selection
of intermediate facilities among a pre-selected set of candidates, and the number of
products to ow between each level of the network to meet the demand. Also, the
capacity of every intermediate facility is limited. Figure 1a this problem illustrates
and show the pre-interdiction ow routing decision. Nonetheless, this problem does
not protect the network against enemy attack.
To better design the network against a targeted attack, we must consider the
optimal attacker strategy. The enemy will, given a limited budget, maximize the post-
interdiction ow routing cost by destroying intermediate facilities (completely). As
a consequence of the facility interdiction, the designer is forced to nd an emergency
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routing strategy. It is essential to state the assumption that the designer can not
open new facilities after a disruptive event. This assumption is justied by the fact
that disruptions are very sudden an unpredictable. Therefore the design is only
capable of reacting on an operational level. This problem reects the cost of operating
the network after an attack. Figure 1b illustrates the post-interdiction ow routing
decision, the ennemy interdict one fqcility from Figure 1a, and it shows the possibles
consequences of such disruptive scenario: (i) the need of rerouting the ow of product
(ii) the incapability of satisfying the demand due to a lack of capacity (the extra ow
goes the dummy facility).
Finally, The design of a robust distribution network under the risk of interdiction
can be modeled as a three-stage game: (i) the operator design an initial multi-echelon
distribution network by selecting a set of facilities and allocate the ow of supply in
the network (ii) the attacker removes facilities within its budget as to maximize
the post-interdiction cost (iii) the operator redistribute the ow among the survived
facilities as to minimize the post-interdiction cost.
However, the network we design is not always under attack, so we which to consider
both the cost under normal and disrupted circumstances. Therefore we dene the
objective of this problem as a weighted sum of the pre-interdiction ow cost, the
post-interdiction ow cost and the xed setup cost of opening facilities. As a result
that the designer is capable of taking into account the attacker strategy by dening
the importance he which to give to the threat to design a network robust against the
worst disruption scenario.
3.2 Mathematical Formulation
The purpose of this research is to provide a robust solution against targeted attack
for multi-echelon facility location network. Consequently, we introduce a generic for-
mulation that applies to all facility location problem, and we called it robust facility
location problem R-FLP because it derives from a generic facility location problem
(FLP). Then we extend the two-level capacitated facility location problem (TCFLP)
using that formulation. We choose TCFLP because it has been the most studied
among the multi-level facility location problem (Ortiz-Astorquiza et al., 2017). The
result of this section is the explicit formulation of the robust two-level capacitated
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facility location problem (R-TCFLP). R-TCFLP is composed of two subproblem
namely Pre-interdiction (Pre(y)) and Post-interdiction (Post(y)) ow routing as-
sociated with the network topology y. Table 2 present the list of mathematical terms
introduced in this section as well as their notation.
Notation Description
FLP Facility Location Problem
R  FLP Robust Facility Location Problem
TCFLP Two-echelon Capacitated Facility Location Problem
R  TCFLP Robust Two-echelon Capacitated Facility Location Problem
Pre(y) Pre-interdiction ow routing Problem given network topology y
Post(y) Post-interdiction ow routing Problem given network topology y
Table 2: List of Problems
The lists of notations and decision variables are used in this chapter are dened
in Tables 3 and 4.
Notation Description
i Index of customer; i 2I
j1 Index of warehouse; j1 2 V1
j2 Index of supplier; j2 2 V2
cab Unit transportation cost from node a to node b
fj Setup cost to open warehouse j
j Capacity of facility j
B Attacker budget
bj Budget required to target facility j
Table 3: List of decision variables
Notation Description
vab Unit of ow from node a to b in the pre-interdiction problem
wab Unit of ow from node a to b in the post-interdiction problem
yj 1 if warehouse j is selected
tj 1 if warehouse j is not targeted by an attack
Table 4: List of decision variables
3.2.1 Robust Facility Location Problem
As described previously, we begin with considering a multi-echelon facility location
problem composed of two type of cost noted 	(y) for the ow routing and F (y) for
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the xed setup cost. We aim to nd the set of facilities y that minimize those two
costs and respect the system of constraint Y	 associated with the distribution of ow
in the system. Equation 1 provide a general formulation of this initial facility location
problem (FLP).
(FLP ) miny2Y	 : 	(y) + F (y) (1)
We modify FLP formulation in order to take into account a potential threat by
considering a weighted combination of the pre-interdiction ow cost 	(y), the post-
interdiction ow cost (y), and the xed setup cost of opening facilities F (y). We
introduce the weight  to control the importance of the pre-interdiction cost over
the post-interdiction cost. The decision variable y has to respect both the post-
interdiction and pre-interdiction constraint noted respectively Y	 and Y. Equation
2 represent the formulation for the robust multi-echelon facility location (R-FLP).
(R  FLP ) miny2Y	\Y : 	(y) + (1  )(y) + F (y) (2)
The post-interdiction problem is a critical part of our formulation because it in-
volves a two player game structures resulting in a nested min-max optimization also
called attacker-defender model (Brown et al., 2006). In an attacker-defender model,
the defender model is the foundation of the problem. In our research, the defender
aims to minimize the operation cost represented by 	(y). Given a network topology
y and the defender model, the enemy maximize the damages he deals (y) described
by Equation 3. The enemy modies the network topology y by targeting facilities
represented by the vector t. The survived network topology is given by t  y (where
 is the element-wise multiplication of vectors).
(y) = maxt2T	(t  y) (3)
We have now a general formulation for our problem. The rest of this section
apply this formulation to TCFLP, which leads us to dene in that context the pre-
interdiction problem Pre(y) and the post interdiction problem Post(y). The explicit
formulation of TCFLP is introduced in the next subsection.
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3.2.2 Robust Two Echelon Facility Location Problem
Two Echelon Facility Location Problem
The commonly accepted formulation of TCFLP was introduced by Aardal, 1998 with
the particularity of using two sets of continuous variables vij1 and wj1j2 representing
the ow to customer i from warehouse j1, and to warehouse j1 from the source j2
respectively. The unit transportation cost associated to vij1 and wj1j2 is respectively
cij1 and cj1j2 . The demand of a customer is represented by di and the capacity of the
warehouse and the source are respectively j1 and j2 . Finally, the binary decision
variable yj1 is equal to 1 if we decide to open the facility j1 at a cost xed fj1 . The
























vij1 8j1 2 V1 (4c)X
i2I
vj1j2  j2yj2 8j2 2 V2 (4d)X
j22V2
vj1j2  j1yj1 8j1 2 V1 (4e)
The objective function 4a includes ow routing cost and setup cost for warehouses.
The demand must be satised 4b. The networks follows the ow conservation property
4c. The capacity of each facility must be respected 4d and 4e.
Pre-Interdiction Problem
We identify the pre-interdiction problem Pre(y) and the xed setup cost F (y) in the
context of TCFLP. Given TCFLP formulation we identify the element of Equation






The rest the problem once we remove F (y) is the pre-interdiction ow network
problem Pre(y). You may notice that this problem is purely a linear, this will be
useful in the following section.
(Pre(y^))



















vij1 8j1 2 V1 (6c)X
i2I
vj1j2  j2 y^j2 8j2 2 V2 (6d)X
j22V2
vj1j2  j1 y^j1 8j1 2 V1 (6e)
Post-Interdiction Problem
We dene the post-interdiction problem in the context of TCFLP using the attacker-
defender model, and then we use reformulation technique to convert the bilevel min-
max formulation into a single level maximization model.
Equation 7 uses the general attacker-defender model introduced by Equation 3.
We assume that only intermediate facilities can be targeted. Therefore the facility
interdiction is only reected in the constraint 7f, and it signies that when a facility
is targeted its capacity becomes null. To dierentiate the decision variables between
post-interdiction and pre-interdiction, we note v the decision variables related to the
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pre-interdiction ow and w the one related to the post-interdiction ow.
(Post(y^))
(y^) = maxt2T	(y^  t) (7a)



















wij1 8j1 2 V1 (7d)X
i2I
wj1j2  j2 y^j2 8j2 2 V2 (7e)X
j22V2
wj1j2  j1 y^j1tj1 8j1 2 V1 (7f)
where: T = ft 2 RjV 1jjPj12V 1 bj1(1  tj1) = B; tj1 2 f0; 1g; 8j1 2 V 1g
In this study, the attacker is allowed to remove nodes from the set of the selected
warehouse y^ to maximize the designer's (minimum) operational cost within the lim-
ited budget B. The binary vector t represent the enemy targets. If the decision
variable tj1 it is equal to 0 then the facility j1 is interdicted.
In a capacitated case, it may happen that after an attack the combined capacity
of the remaining intermediate facilities is not sucient to handle all the demand. To
handle that case, we assume that we dispose of an untargetable emergency facility
that collect and distribute the remaining ow, applying a penalty for each unit of
ow delivered via this dummy facility. For the sake of simplicity, we add the emer-
gency facility to the dataset as a free warehouse with unlimited capacity, and a xed
transportation cost designated as emergency cost.
Post(y^) is a bi-level mixed integer problem, however, as mentioned before the
inner ow routing problem is a linear problem; therefore we can use the duality theory
to convert this bi-level formulation into in single level maximization model by taking
the dual of the inner optimization. We consider ; ; ;  the dual variables associated
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with the inner minimization problem and reformulate our problem as follows:
(Post(y^)))










s:t :i   j1  cij1 ; 8i 2 I; 8j1 2 V 1 (8b)





bj1   B (8d)
The terms tj1  j1 in the objective function 8a is nonlinear because it involves
the product of two decision variables. This problem can be linearized by substituting
tj1 and j1 by a single decision variable that we call tj1 and by adding the standard
linearizion constraints 9a, 9b, and 9c.
tj1   j1  tj1  0 ; 8j1 2 V 1 (9a)
tj1   j1  ; 8j1 2 V 1 (9b)
tj1   j1   j1tj1    j1 ; 8j1 2 V 1 (9c)
j1 is the shadow cost associated with the capacity constraint of facility j1. j1
represents an upper bound for j1 . However Lim and Smith, 2007 emphasize that to
obtain the best result from this linearized mixed-integer programming formulation
one must use the smallest possible upper bound for j1 . A good upper bound we
choose is the longest simple path linking a facility j1 to any couple customer-supplier
(i; j2) 2 V 1  V 2 dened in Equation 10.
j1  j1 = max(cij1 + cj1j2); 8i 2 I; 8j2 2 V 2 (10)
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Final Formulation
By pulling together all the elements of the previous sections, we dene the nal



































vij1 8j1 2 V1 (11c)X
i2I
vj1j2  j2yj2 8j2 2 V2 (11d)X
j22V2
vj1j2  j1yj1 8j2 2 V2 (11e)
i   j1  cij1 8i 2 I; 8j1 2 V 1 (11f)





bj1   B (11h)
tj1   j1  tj1  0 8j1 2 V 1 (11i)
tj1   j1  8j1 2 V 1 (11j)
tj1   j1   j1tj1    j1 8j1 2 V 1 (11k)
3.3 Interpretation of the Formulation
The formulation presented in the previous section is convenient for two reasons; rst,
the designer can adjust the importance given to a disruption or threat, second, it
oers it is suitable regarding resolution methods. However, it is not easy for the
23
manager to visualize the ins and outs of this formulation as it is. Therefore in this
section, we oer comprehensive insight on the subject.
To illustrate the use of this methodology we propose a more user-friendly formu-
lation of R-TCFLP and we introduce r(y) the increase in operating cost due to an
optimal interdiction when given a set of open intermediary facility y.
(y) = 	(y) + r(y) (12)
R-TCFLP can be reformulated as the sum of the annualized cost of the network
under normal circumstances 	(y) + F (y) and the weighted additional cost due to
any malicious disruptive event.
Z = miny2Y	(y) + F (y) + (1  )r(y) (13)
Figure 2 illustrates the dierence between TCFLP and R-TCFLP per unit of time.
The design produced with R-TCFLP increase the network pre-interdiction operation
cost and xed setup cost 	(y) + F (y). However, in return, the cost of operating the
network during the post-interdiction phase (d) will be signicantly reduced. Adjusting
the parameter  let the managers decide to which extent the threat must be taken
into account in the design of a supply chain network. One must not forget that the
budget of the interdictor B is the second parameter that inuences r(y).





The mathematical description of our problem is a bi-level mixed-integer linear pro-
gram (BLMIP). The traditional method used to solve such problem is reformulation
based on Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality condition to convert the bi-level
problem into a single level problem. However, the KKT condition does not apply to
the inner optimization when its variables are not all continuous, because the problem
has, in general, no strong duality property. Therefore it is in general not possible
to use reformulation technique when solving discrete interdiction problems. Instead,
decomposition techniques using an enumeration of extreme points are used to solve
such problem. It is proven that in this type of problem at least one optimal solution
is reached at an extreme point of the constraint region (Saharidis and Ierapetritou,
2009).
In this chapter, we developed a Bender Decomposition (BD) algorithm and im-
proved Bender decomposition to solve as eciently as possible our problem to op-
timality. We formally introduce the Standard Bender Decomposition in the next
section, and then we apply BD to our problem. Finally, we review the methods
dedicated to accelerating the Bender Decomposition and we develop two ways of
improving the computation time of this algorithm. The Section 4.3 deals with inte-
grated the so-called super-valid inequalities to further constrain our problem at each
iteration and converge faster toward the solution. Section 4.4 uses the Papadakos
(2008) method which aims to nd a non-dominated cut at each iteration by adding
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cuts called Pareto-optimal.
4.1 Standard Bender Decomposition
4.1.1 Formal Denition
Decomposition methods are often used to solve a large-scale optimization problem
because they reduce the size of the problem that the computer has to consider at
once. Such techniques as introduced by Benders (1962) can be used to solve bi-
level linear problems (Saharidis and Ierapetritou, 2009). The Bender decomposition
algorithm (BD) divide any problem into a master problem (MP) and a slave problem
(SP). Then the result of MP provide a solution that is used to set variable constant for
SP, and by solving SP we can create a Bender cut that will constraint MP. We repeat
the process of solving variations of SP based on the solution of MP and constrain
MP based on SP solution until MP and SP objective function reach an acceptable
gap. Upper and lower bound of the original problem are provided by MP and SP
respectively at each iteration, and Benders (1962) demonstrated that after a nite
number of iteration this algorithm converges to an optimal solution.
We formally introduce some general minimization problem P:
(P ) min : cTw + f(y) (14a)
s:t : Aw + F (y)  b (14b)
w  0 (14c)
y 2 Y (14d)
Where c is a vector of coecient associated to the vector of continuous variables
w, and f is scalar functions that take the vector of variables y as input. Similarly,
A is the matrix of coecient associated with the constraints multiplied with the
vector of variables w and F a set of scalar functions that takes as input the vector of
variables y. Given this problem P we isolate the set of variable w, and we formulate
the following sub-problem (SP) where y become a constant vector noted y. SP is
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mathematical describe as following:
(SP )min : z(w) := cTw (15a)
s:t : Aw  b  y (15b)
u  0 (15c)
The Bender Decomposition algorithm deals with on the dual problem of SP instead
(Dual-SP), because the dual variables' are related to constraint right-hand side value
and are required to generate Bender cut for MP. We dene u the set of dual variables
of Dual-SP.
(Dual   SP )max : z(u; y) := (b  y)Tu (16a)
s:t : ATu  c (16b)
u  0 (16c)
By successively solving Dual-SP for dierent values of y provided by MP we
characterize the polyhedron U which dene the feasible region of our problem P
by enumerating the set of extreme points P and extreme rays R. As a result, the
corresponding Bender Master Problem (MP) is:
(MP )min : f(y) + z (17a)
s:t : (b  y)T u  z ; 8u 2 P (17b)
(b  y)T u  0 ; 8u 2 R (17c)
y 2 Y (17d)
Constraints 17b and 17c represent the set of all the Bender cuts. If all possible
elements of P and R were added at once, the problem would be solved in one iteration.
Instead of enumerating all possible extreme ray and point which is very dicult,
Bender proposes an iterative procedure which starts with empty sets P and R, and
then iteratively solve Dual-SP and MP. Where Dual-SP uses the solution y of the MP
and the solution u of Dual-SP provides 17b if the solution is unbounded otherwise
17c is generated. The process repeats as long as the optimality gap is not closed. As
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a result, it is often not necessary to nd all elements of P and R to nd an optimal
solution.
According to the previous decomposition, Algorithm 1 provide an -optimal solu-
tion where  is the user-dened acceptable optimality gap.
Algorithm 1: Bender decomposition
Result: -optimal solution y and w
initialization;
while UB-LB   do
Step 1: Solve MP and obtain y ;
Step 2: Solve Dual-SP and obtain u ;
if SP is unbounded then
R  R [ f u g ;
else
P  P [ f u g ;
LB  c(y) + z ;
UB  min fUB, c(y) + z(u)g;
end
end
The Bender decomposition methods convert the initial problem into a bi-level
min-max problem. In the specic case of an attacker-defender model, we are al-
ready dealing with such structure. Thus solving our bi-level interdiction network is
equivalent to apply a special case of BD where the decomposition splits attackers
and defenders decision variables. Wood (2011) demonstrated the correctness of such
methodology and several studies applied it to solve similar problems (Lim and Smith,
2007), (Smith et al., 2007).
4.1.2 Application to R-TCFLP
As mentioned before we use Bender Decomposition to be able to solve our bi-level
mixed integer problem. In our case, the dual sub-problem (Dual-SP) correspond
exactly to Post(y) the post-interdiction ow routing problem. By doing so, the
master problem (MP) is single level mixed integer program that we can solve with
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any commercial solver. At each iteration the following (MP) is solved:
ZMP = miny :	(y) + (1  )Z + F (y) (18a)
s:t :(6b); (6c); (6d); (6e) (18b)
Z  z(u; y) ; 8 2  (18c)
yj1 2 f0; 1g ; 8j1 2 V 1 (18d)
Where constraint (18c) represents the Bender cut added to the master problem
at iteration  and  is the set of generated cut.
At each iteration the problem Post(y) (Equation 8) is solved and the decision
variables u = jjjj (jj Concatenation of vector) values are used to dene a new
Bender cut, we note those values u = jjjj. z(u; y) designate the objective
function of Post(y) (see 8a) at iteration  where the decision variables are replaced
by; ;  and the decision variable y is set free. The explicit form of the Bender











We consider  an acceptable optimality gap, then the lower bound z

is provided
by the (MP) as the value of the decision variable Z, while the upper bound z is
equal to (Dual-SP) objective value. Finally, we implemented Algorithm 2 to solve
our specic problem.
Algorithm 2: Bender decomposition applied to T-TCFLP
Result: -optimal solution y (robust set of facility)
initialization;
while z   z

  do
Step 1: Solve MP and obtain y and z

;
Step 2: Solve Dual-SP and obtain ; ; t and z;
Step 3: add a new Bender cut Z  z(u; y) ;
end
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4.2 Background in Acceleration Methods for BD
The standard Bender decomposition is known for its slow convergence (Saharidis and
Ierapetritou, 2010). This is particularly true for network design problems as demon-
strated by Magnanti and Wong (1981). Indeed, the deciency of DB on that type of
problem leads to the generation of an exorbitant number of cut in order to converge.
The issues of BD in general are (i) The quality of the BD cut at each iteration, (ii)
The weak lower bound generated in case of minimization problem Azad et al. (2013),
(iii) The deterioration of the solution as the number of cut increase. Decomposi-
tion procedures are attractive candidates since a lot of design problem involves at
least two types of decisions and it is very tempting to isolate the complicating vari-
able. Therefore Bender decomposition has been extensively studied and researcher
developed accelerated versions of BD algorithm.
Early work on the topic such as Georion and Graves (1974) focuses on the im-
portance of nding a proper formulation of the problem that would improve the
convergence of the BD algoritm. Later works looked on ways to reduce computa-
tion time at each iteration especially when the MP or SP arehHard to solve. For
instance McDaniel and Devine (1977) proposed to solve the LP relaxation of MP in
a rst phase until we reach an acceptable optimality gap and then terminating the
algorithm by reintroducing the integrality constraints. Cote and Laughton, 1984 uses
heuristics that replace the MP and/or SP. Zakeri et al. (2000) introduces inexact cuts
in the MP by not solving the SP to optimality.
The most recent literature oers numerous ecient techniques to accelerate BD
algorithm. We can summarize those new techniques applied to improve BD into three
categories namely (i) generation of valid inequalities that speed-up the algorithm, (ii)
the generation of super-valid inequalities that cut-o non optimal feasible solution
such that it reduces the number of iteration, and (iii) the generation of cut bundles
such that each iteration generates multiple cuts to further constraint the MP. In our
thesis we focuses our eorts on the two rst techniques and implemented them into
our solution methods. The third technique is not suitable for our problem because SP
is relatively dicult while this technique is a trado between the number of iteration
(i.e solving MP and SP) and the number of cut generated at each iteration (i.e solving
MP and multiple time variations of SP) Azad et al., 2013.
Magnanti and Wong (1981) studied the generation of non-dominated cut at each
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iteration, what they refer to as Pareto-optimal cuts. They design a modied version
of BD in which at each iteration the Magnanti-Wong cut generation problem is solve
using a MP core point. Later on Papadakos (2008) proposed to solve the independent
Magnanti-Wong problem in order to enhance the Pareto-optimal cut generation and
demonstrate that it is not necessary to use a core point to generate Pareto-optimal
cut, but instead what he called alternative Magnanti-Wong point are susant.
Israeli and Wood (2002) to improve the bender decomposition applied the the
shortest path network interdiction problem develop a specic type of cut that called
super-valid inequalities. The particularity of a SVI is that it removes feasible solution
but not the optimal solution, as a result it helps solving the problem by reducing the
volume of the convex hull. Later, Wood (2011) generalize the idea for bilevel network
interdiction problem.
4.3 Super-Valid Inequalities
In this subsection, the strategy adopted to speed-up the BD algorithm is to generate
additional cuts called super-valid inequalities (SVIs) that will strengthen the linear
relaxation of MP. The principle of SVIs is introduced in Israeli and Wood, 2002 and
extend the theory of valid inequalities in integer-programing theory. Valid inequalities
are cutting down the feasible region of a linear relaxation but keep all feasible integer
solution, whereas SVIs reduce the size of the integer feasible area and are guaranteed
not to eliminate all optimal solutions. In the section we introduce the formal concep
of super-valid inqualites and provide two type of SVIs to solve our problem.
Denition 4.3.1 ibid. Let x and y denote, respectively, the vectors of continuous
and integer variables in an MIP, let c1 and c2 be two conforming vectors of constants,
respectively, and let c0 be a scalar constant. The inequality c1x+c2y  c0 is supervalid
for this MIP, that is, it is a supervalid inequality for the MIP, if (i) adding that
inequality to the MIP does not eliminate all optimal solutions or (ii) an incumbent
solution to the MIP, (bx,by), is (already) optimal.
The SVI are added to MP as the same time as the Bender cut generated. Al-
gorithm 3 shows the enhanced Bander decomposition using super-valid inequalities.
This algorithm is composed of two phases. The rst phases relax the integrality con-
straint in the MP and follow the Bender procedure until an -optimal is found for the
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relaxed problem. The second phase reintroduce the itegrality constraint and continue
the Bender procedure untill we nd an -optimal.
Algorithm 3: SVI: BD and Super-Valid Inequalities applied to T-TCFLP
Result: -optimal solution y (robust set of facility)
Initialization:
Solve MP and obtain initial y0 ;
Phase 1:
integrality tolerance 0:5 ;
while z   z

  do
Step 1: Solve MP and obtain y and z

;
Step 2: Solve Dual-SP and obtain t and z;
Step 3: add a new Bender cut Z  (y) to MP ;
Step 4: Add a new SVI to MP ;
end
Phase 2:
Add integer constraint: integrality tolerance 1 10 5 ;
while z   z

  do
Step 1: Solve MP and obtain y and z

;
Step 2: Solve Dual-SP and obtain t and z;
Step 3: add a new Bender cut Z  z(u; y) ;
Step 4: Add a new SVI to MP ;
end
4.3.1 Type-I SVI applied to R-TCFLP
The rst type of SVIs (Type-I) is directly derived from Wood, 2011. The decision
variable of SP tj1 is equal to 0 if the facility j1 was a target of the interdictor or
if the shadow cost associated to the capacity of j1 is null. In that case, at least one
of the remaining facilities must be selected. Lets considere the following Bender cut












Then according to Wood, 2011 the following inequality is super-valid:
X
j12V 1
I( tj1)yj1  1 (20)
I( tj1) =
8<:1 if tj1  00 otherwise (21)
Type-I SVI attempt to convert the problem into a purely combinatorial prob-
lem. Note that we can also design a lifting procedure for Type-I inequalities. Let
A = (j1 tj1)j12V 1, we dene S = (si)
jV 1j
i=1 = sort(A) as the unique non-increasing






(j2 j2) yj2   z  
kX
i=1
si  0 (22)
As a result, the previous SVI can be tighten as following:
X
j12V 1
I( tj1)yj1  k (23)
4.3.2 Type-II SVI applied to R-TCFLP
The second type of SVI (Type-II) uses a particularity of our problem. As a matter
of fact, the post-interdiction problem will always be more expensive than the pre-
interdiction problem, because the cost of operating the network after removing any
facility increase. Thus it is true that for any feasible solution y and we can state that
	(y)  (y)
ZMP (y) = 	(y) + (1  )(y) + F (y) (24)
ZMP (y)  	(y) + (1  )	(y) + F (y) (25)
ZMP (y)  F (y)  	(y) (26)
For any given Bender cut , the following inequality is super-valid for MP:
Z  ZMP (y)  F (y) (27)
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Table 5: Example - Problem 6b43 rst iteration
j1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
tj1 7,755 7,077 0 8,115 7,200 10,385 0 7,755 6,164 9,020
j1 21 8 19 17 13 10 21 15 13 9
Each iteration provides a Type-II, resulting in a strong lower bound for Z that
will remove inadequate solutions and faster the convergence ot this algorithm.
4.3.3 Illustration of Type-I and Type-II SVI
Here, we demonstrate on an example the application of Type-I and Type-II for a
given iteration of the Bender Decomposition algorithm. As an example we consider
the dataset 6b43 that contain 10 customers, 10 potential facilities and 5 suppliers.




(j1 tj1)yj1  659310
The coecients j1 and tj1 are summarized in table 5. Additional informations
are summarize below.
y = [2; 6; 7; 8]
ZMP (y) = 322209





(j2 j2) yj2 = 659310
This Bender cuts result into a lifted Type-I SVI where the sum of yj1 with ji 2 V 1
f3; 7g must be greater or equal to 2 and a Type-II SVI dening a lower bound for Z
Type  I : y1 + y2 + y4 + y5 + y6 + y8 + y9 + y10  2 (28a)
Type  II : Z  36210 (28b)
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4.4 Pareto Optimal cuts
In this subsection, the strategy adopted to speed-up the BD algorithm is adding a
non-dominated cut at each iteration. That particular type of cut is called Pareto-
Optimal.
Denition 4.4.1 Pareto-Optimal (Magnanti and Wong, 1981) A cut is called Pareto-
optimal if no other cut dominate it. Since, a cut is dened by the point u0. This is
said Pareto-optimal.
Magnanti andWong (ibid.) created a method to systematically nd Pareto-Optimal
cut by using a core point of the problem studied.
Denition 4.4.2 Core Point (ibid.) y0 is a core point of Y if and only if it is con-
tained in the relative interior y0 2 ri(Y c) of the convex hull Y c of Y.
However Magnanti and Wong (ibid.) cut generation method is dicult to solve
and may reduce the performance of the algorithm. Instead, we used in our algorithm
the Papadakos cut generation problem (Papadakos, 2008) also called Independent
Magnanti-Wong problem, because it has better performances. Moreover, Papadakos
methods elegantly ts our needs, because it is equivalent to the Bender subproblem
(y) for a core point of our problem.
Denition 4.4.3 Papadakos cut generation problem (ibid.) Let y0 be a core point of
Y, then the optimal solution solution u0 of (y0) is pareto optimal
Another diculty of Magnanti and Wong (1981) methods is nding a core point.
Fortunately Papadakos, 2008 also demonstrate that a core point is not necessary to
generate a Pareto-Optimal cut. He introduces instead the Magnanti-Wong Point that
is sucient to generate Pareto-Optimal cuts.
Denition 4.4.4 Magnanti-Wong Point (ibid.) A Magnati-Wong point is a point y0
for which the solution of (y0) gives a Pareto-Optimal sulution u0
Finally, Magnanti andWong, 1981 provided multiple techniques to generate Magnanti-
Wong Point. We use Equation 29 to generate approximate Magnanti-Wong Point.
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The approximate point of the next iteration y+10 is the combination of the previous









Algorithm 4 was implemented using Equation 29 where y=10 has all its elements
equals to 1 at the rst iteration. This algorithm is similar to Algorithm 3 in the sense
that it is composed of two phases: (i) relaxation of the integrality constraint in MP,
(ii) reintroducing integrality constraint in MP. The dierences are located in step 1
and 5.
Algorithm 4: BD and Independent Magnanti-Wong problem applied to R-
TCFLP
Result: -optimal solution y (robust set of facility)
Initialization:
Solve MP and obtain initial y0 ;
Phase 1:
integrality tolerance 0:5 ;
while UB-LB   do
Step 1: Solve I-MW and obtain cut Z  y0;(y) ;
Step 2: Solve MP and obtain y and z

;
Step 3: Solve Dual-SP and obtain t and z ;
Step 4: Add a new Bender cut Z  z(u; y) ;
Step 5:Update y0  12y0 + 12 y
end
Phase 2:
Add integer constraint: integrality tolerance 1 10 5 ;
while UB-LB   do
Step 1: Solve I-MW and obtain cut Z  y0;(y) ;
Step 2: Solve MP and obtain y and z

;
Step 3: Solve Dual-SP and obtain t and z ;
Step 4: Add a new Bender cut Z  z(u; y) ;





We perform a series of numerical experiments to evaluate the performance of our
proposed model and solution methods. We tested all algorithm on three datasets
containing 49, 88 nodes. The datasets are directly extracted from Snyder and Daskin
(2004). We used our solution method on networks for jV 2j equals 5 suppliers located
in a randomly selected city based on Li et al. (2013) which states that ve to eight
distributor is a reasonably large regional distribution network for up to 150 customers.
Each dataset size was solved over 5 instances with dierent randomly selected supplier
location. In all datasets the set of customer I is equal to the set of potential warehouse
V1, in other words, each city can host both customer and facility.
Tables 6 and 7 provides a description of the instances we used in this study. They
displays TCFLP solution in terms of cost and selected intermediate facilities.
jV 1j jV 2j F (y) F (y) + 	(y) 	(y) y
problem id $k $k $k
P0 1276 49 5 263 1,620 1,356 11, 38, 40, 42, 47
P1 1277 49 5 268 817 549 3, 9, 13, 30, 35
P2 1278 49 5 340 1,576 1,236 1, 10, 18, 21, 22
P3 1279 49 5 197 1,792 1,594 6, 12, 31, 33
P4 127a 49 5 379 1,006 627 6, 10, 19, 21, 23, 43
Table 6: 49-node instances
The algorithms are coded in Python, uses CPLEX version 12.8 as a linear pro-
gramming solver and run on Windows 7 SP1 PC with 3.20 GHz 2 Duo core CPU and
16.0 GB of physical RAM. The gap tolerance is set at 5% and the algorithm after
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jV 1j jV 2j F (y) F (y) + 	(y) 	(y) y
problem id $k $k $k
P5 127c 88 5 236 2,893 2,656 8, 49, 54, 59, 75
P6 127d 88 5 248 2,937 2,689 6, 9, 15, 46, 66
P7 127e 88 5 380 2,040 1,660 11, 33, 52, 75, 77, 78
P8 127f 88 5 320 2,709 2,388 22, 28, 31, 49, 71
P9 1280 88 5 246 3,142 2,895 7, 11, 30, 48, 85
Table 7: 88-node instances
7200s if it did not attain the tolerance gap.
Parameter values for our datasets are given in Table 8, those values are extracted
from Snyder and Daskin (2005).
Description notation value
Transportation cost ca;b Euclidean distance between city a and city b
Demand di equal to the state population divided by 10
5
Fixed cost fj1 Median home value in the city
Emergency cost e 104
Optimality tolerance  0.05
Table 8: Parameters for datasets
5.1 Benet of Considering Facility Interdiction
In this section, we investigate the benet of the proposed design model. First, the
proposed methods are illustrated on a single example to visualize and compare its
solution to the classical TCFLP, and then we analyze the impact of parameters such as
the weight of the post-interdiction (), and the attacker budget (B) on the decision.
5.1.1 Topology and Cost Comparison
In this subsection, we study the benets of considering potential disruption resulting
from a targeted attack while designing a supply chain network. For this purpose, we
look at the robustness of a solution for dierent values  and budget B. We use a
detailed example derived from the 49-node dataset.
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(a) TCFLP (b) R-TCFLP  = 0:99, B=2
(c) R-TCFLP  = 0:90, B=2 (d) R-TCFLP  = 0:80, B=2
Figure 3: Pre-Interdiction ow routing
This experiment is designed as follows: rst, we consider problem P1 of the 49-
node dataset which serves the best our explanation and solves TCFLP using this
dataset. The topology of this solution is represented in Figure 3a. Then we compute
the best possible attack on TCFLP solution and the post-interdiction routing using
the attacker-defender model. Figure 4a represents the topology of the network after
an attack on TCFLP solution. We applied the same procedure to compare R-TCFLP
solutions for dierent values of  and TCFLP solution. Figure 3 represent the topology
of the network designed using TCFLP and R-TCFLP with  equals to 0.99, 0.90, and
0.8. Each solution can be compared with their topology after an intelligent attack
in gure 4. For this experiment, we assume that the attacker as sucient budget to
eliminate two facilities (i.e., B = 2).
Table 9 display the selected facilities and the costs associated to each of the four
solutions studied in this section. TCFLP selects ve intermediate facilities resulting
in an annualized xed cost of $268,200 and an annual transportation cost of $549,008.
However, in the hypothesis of a targeted attack, this design will undergo tremendous
nancial loss. In that event, the designer implements mitigation operation by reas-
signing the customers to a surviving facilities; however the impossibility of satisfying
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(a) TCFLP (b) R-TCFLP  = 0:99, B=2
(c) R-TCFLP  = 0:90, B=2 (d) R-TCFLP  = 0:80, B=2
Figure 4: Post-Interdiction ow routing
the demand facilities result in a tremendous increase is post-interdiction cost. The
post-interdiction cost is 37 times larger than the pre-interdiction cost with this model.
In that specic example, 40% of the demand can not be met, and 20 cities out of
49 are ignored in the disrupted distribution network. This situation is represented in
Figure 4a. A tightly optimized solution in a capacitated case, result in catastrophic
nancial impact due to the limited capacity of the remaining intermediate facilities.
solution F  	
R-TCFLP  = 0:80 3, 9, 13, 15, 24, 30, 35, 41 451,900 1,227,128 455,039
R-TCFLP  = 0:90 3, 9, 13, 24, 25, 30, 35 408,200 1,459,292 466,041
R-TCFLP  = 0:99 3, 9, 13, 15, 24, 30, 35 385,300 2,009,783 473,741
TCFLP 3, 9, 13, 30, 35 268,200 21,102,407 549,008
Table 9: Solutions and costs for problem P1
A quantitative evaluation of those four solutions are displayed in Figure5 with
respect to annual investment 	(~y)+F (~y) and in terms of post-interdiction cost (~y)
. A robust solution generated with R-TCFLP contains between 7 and 8 facilities
depending on the importance given to the threat (i.e., the closer to  is from 1, the
less the threat is taken into account). It is reasonable to say that we are selecting
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backup facilities to prevent the losses in case of major disruption, because if we
compare the solution in Table 9 we see that the facilities selected by TCFLP are
also in R-TCFLP solution. However, the location of the backup facilities may change
based on the importance of the threat. Adding intermediate facilities to the network
comes at a cost. For instance, in the robust design of the experiment, the xed cost
(F) increases from 40% to 70% compared to TCFLP (Table 9), however having more
intermediate facilities also reduce the transportation cost due to the fact that each
facility delivers customers in a smaller area. As a result, the total annual cost (gure
5a) of designing a robust network increase by 5% to 10% compared to TCFLP. In
return, in the event of an attack the post-interdiction cost increase by 2 to 3 times
compared to the pre-interdiction cost against 37 times in the case of TCFLP.
(a) Design costs (b) Post interdiction
Figure 5: The cost of facility interdiction
5.1.2 Impact of the Weight Attributed to The Disruption
To compare solutions for dierent value of  we would like to know how many days of
disruption the network should be exposed to in order to observe potential savings. In
this experiment, we consider three values for  and look at the dierence in investment
and robustness of the solution obtained for the problem P1 studied in the previous
section.
We dene the relative investment I as the dierence between the annualized cost
without disruption for R-TCFLP and TCFLP objective value. let yR be R-TCFLP
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optimal solution and y TCFLP optimal solution then I is given by Equation 30.
I = 	(y) + F (y)  [	(yR) + F (yR)] (30)
We also dene relative post-interdiction r which is given by Equation 31.
r =  [r(y)  r(yR)] (31)
We are looking to evaluate the least recovery time such that selecting the robust
solution is nancially benecial. In other words, if the disruption time over a year is







R-TCFLP  = 0:80 89,730 19,781 2
R-TCFLP  = 0:90 57,033 19,560 1
R-TCFLP  = 0:99 41,833 19,017 1
Table 10: Comparison of Investment for problem P1
Table 10 demonstrates that the investment in robust network creates saving if
the disruption last a minimum of 1 or 2 days per year. We perform this analysis of
the least recovery time before return on investment on all instances and summarises
them in Table 11.The solutions generated in this example protects the network against
the interdiction of two facilities (i.e., B=2), and we look at the performances of the
network against worst case interdictions from 1 up to 4 facilities (B*). A solution
obtain with R-TCFLP will be viable in less than two weeks if the enemy attacks
a single facility, and less than two days if the enemy target more than one facility.
Moreover, when two facilities are interdicted where the network is designed to be
robust against an attacker with a budget of two the resulting value of d is about the
same no matter the value of .
Tables 12 and 13 in there rst column displays the solution of R-TCFLP for each
instance and dierent values of . One should notice that we observe minor changes a
 changes. The changes consist of adding an extra facility or replacing some facilities
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B* 1 2 3 4
 0.99 0.90 0.80 0.99 0.90 0.80 0.99 0.90 0.80 0.99 0.90 0.80
49-node 6 11 14 1 2 3 2 2 2 1 2 3
88-node 6 9 15 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 6
Table 11: Average annual disruption time before return on investment
B* (# facility interdicted) 0 1 2 3 4
rho solution k$ % % % %
P0 0.99 11, 28, 29, 38, 40, 42 1,316 14 55 1046 2026
0.9 9, 28, 29, 38, 40, 42 1,310 10 42 1051 2036
0.8 11, 18, 28, 38, 40, 42, 47 1,310 5 24 346 1317
P1 0.99 3, 9, 13, 15, 24, 30, 35 473 119 324 2849 5331
0.9 3, 9, 13, 24, 25, 30, 35 466 88 213 1781 4379
0.8 3, 9, 13, 15, 24, 30, 35, 41 455 90 170 1369 3950
P2 0.99 1, 7, 10, 21, 34, 45 1,235 99 122 1239 2272
0.9 0, 10, 21, 22, 27, 34, 38, 45 1,188 12 39 406 1366
0.8 0, 10, 21, 22, 27, 38, 45, 46 1,188 12 34 406 1366
P3 0.99 6, 12, 21, 31, 33, 36 1,524 5 78 861 1674
0.9 6, 12, 15, 31, 33, 36, 38 1,518 6 24 480 1274
0.8 6, 12, 18, 21, 31, 33, 36 1,512 4 20 344 1134
P4 0.99 6, 10, 19, 21, 23, 32, 41 569 55 644 2855 4931
0.9 6, 10, 19, 21, 23, 32, 43, 47 573 21 123 1409 3323
0.8 6, 10, 19, 21, 23, 32, 43, 47 573 21 123 1409 3323
Table 12: Comparison of solution depending on  - 49-node
while the total number of facilities remain the same. The remaining column of those
tables represents rst the cost of distributing the goods in the network under normal
condition 	(y) then the percent post-interdiction increase when optimally targeting
1 to 4 facilities. We can see that some problem are more robust, because the percent
increase is smaller (P0 and P3 for instance).
5.1.3 Impact of the Attacker Budget
In this subsection, we analyze the impact of choosing dierent attacker budgets when
designing a network using R-TCFLP. In this experiment, we are only concerned by
the 49-node datasets and ran the algorithm for B varying between 1 and 3. The
parameter  takes the values 0.99, 0.90, 0.80. As a result, this experiment compares
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B* (# facility interdicted) 0 1 2 3 4
rho solution k$ % % % %
P5 0.99 1, 7, 8, 49, 54, 59, 75 2,619 5 30 833 1732
0.9 1, 7, 48, 54, 59, 70, 73 2,608 6 24 760 1488
0.8 1, 7, 8, 41, 49, 54, 59, 73, 75 2,612 4 9 30 211
P6 0.99 6, 8, 9, 15, 46, 66 2,686 4 51 909 1741
0.9 6, 7, 8, 9, 15, 46, 66 2,657 4 18 52 920
0.8 6, 8, 9, 15, 30, 46, 59, 66 2,677 4 8 42 583
P7 0.99 4, 11, 36, 41, 43, 52, 78 1,695 17 123 1243 2387
0.9 11, 33, 48, 52, 56, 66, 75 1,639 13 81 1363 2715
0.8 4, 11, 26, 33, 43, 46, 48, 52,
66, 75
1,632 7 32 73 131
P8 0.99 3, 22, 28, 31, 49, 71, 80 2,341 20 41 517 1380
0.9 22, 28, 31, 36, 49, 71, 80 2,338 20 34 386 1260
0.8 22, 28, 31, 36, 49, 71, 80 2,338 20 34 386 1260
P9 0.99 7, 11, 12, 25, 48, 85 2,916 16 47 821 1594
0.9 7, 11, 30, 32, 48, 77, 85 2,876 2 21 538 1204
0.8 7, 11, 25, 30, 32, 48, 51, 85 2,873 2 10 31 465
Table 13: Comparison of solution depending on  - 88-node
nine decisions corresponding to all possible pairs (B,).
Figure 6 represents ratio of the relative investment I to the optimal objective
function value of TCFLP for each of the nine designs. It is clear that the higher B,
the more signicant the investment in robustness. Similarly, the smaller , the lower
the investment. On top of that, the investment seems to increase linearly for a given
.
Figure 7 compare the robustness of each solution when removing 1, 2, 3 or 4 facil-
ities. It displays the ratio r to TCFLP solution's post-interdiction cost. Therefore
if a point value equals to 1, then it means that the solution has the same perfomances
as TCFLP.
When optimally removing one facility (Figure 7a) all the solution are performing
equally and reduce r(y) by about ten times.
Similarly, when optimally removing two facilities, the performances of solutions
designed to sustain an attacker budget of two or three also reduce r(y) by about ten
times (Figure 7b). However, the performances of the solutions designed with B = 1
drop, but remain better than TCFLP. It is also important to notice that the results
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Figure 6: Relative investment for multiplies values of B and 
for (1,0.80), (1,0.90), (1,0.99) are extremely spread, they are going from 0.05 to 1
depending on the instances. This can be explain vy the fact that the initial design
did not have enught slack to to accomodate interdictions greater than 1 facility
Figure 7c and Figure 7d are very similar and illustrates how the solution performs
when optimally removing three or four facilities. In those case, we see a pattern similar
to Figure 6: the performances linearly decreases when B increase and  decreases.
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(a) 1 facility removed (b) 2 facilities removed
(c) 3 facilities removed (d) 4 facilities removed
Figure 7: Relative post-interdiction cost reduction for multiplies values of B and 
5.2 Comparison Between Solution Methods
In this section, we present result based on instances described in Table 6 and 7. We
show in which extent the proposed methods improve the eciency of the standard
Bender Decomposition. We compare four types of algorithms listed in Table 14. We
aim primarily to compare BD to MW and SVI; however, both use the linear relaxation
of the master problem (LR). Therefore we also include in our study LR algorithm to
better assess the performance of MW and SVI. Indeed, that way we know the impact
of relaxing the integrability constraint in the master problem independently of the
cuts added by the two other methods in the Bender decomposition.
Detailed result for each of the four algorithm are listed in Tables 16 and 17. Each
table provides performances regarding CPU time (T (s)) and the number of iteration
(Iter.) as well as gaps for both the Bender Decomposition (BD gap) and the overall
problem R-TCFLP (overall gap). BD gap is computed using BD LB corresponds
to the biggest value of Z in the master problem, and BD UB that corresponds to
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Abbr. Designation
BD Standard Bender Decomposition
LR Bender Decomposition with linear relaxation of the master problem
MW Bender Decomposition with Magnanti-Wong pareto-optimal cuts
SVI Bender Decomposition with super-valid inequalities
Table 14: List and designation od compared algorithm
the smallest solution of the subproblem (y). Similarly, the overall gap is computed
using the overall LB which corresponds to the biggest value of the objective function
of R-TCFLP during the Bender Decomposition (see Equation 18a), while the UB is
an evaluation of the objective function given the solution y (see Equation 2).
The renaming of this section provides a comparison between each of the four
algorithms in terms of speed, quality of solution and convergence of the algorithm.
5.2.1 Comparison of CPU Time and Number of Iteration
The standard Bender decomposition (BD) solved 27 out 30 datasets within the 7 200-
seconds time limit (i.e 90% of the problems), only three cases where  = 0:8 reached
the time limit. The enhanced methods can solve the same number problem, therefore
we can conclude that an instance that is hard for BD is also for LR, SVI, and MW.
Table 15 summarize the average CPU time and the number of iteration per problem
size and post-interdiction weight for each of our four algorithms. First of all, we can
see in this table that the complexity of all algorithm increase for instances with a
higher problem size jV 1j and a smaller value of .
T (s) Iter.
BD LR SVI MW BD LR SVI MW
jV 1j 
49 0.8 225 123 145 74 75 84 86 45
0.9 105 57 49 32 48 57 56 35
0.99 21 13 15 13 14 28 28 19
88 0.8 5,843 5,937 5,342 3,897 100 129 123 72
0.9 2,045 1,097 879 618 69 87 80 45
0.99 91 56 54 46 14 29 26 18
Avg. var. -35.8% -36.9% -54.1% +49.6 % +43.3% -9.1%
Table 15: CPU time and number of iterations
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We observe that relaxing the integrability condition on the master problem (LR)
already improve signicantly the performance in terms of CPU time, while the number
of iteration increases. The better performance of LR can be partially explained by
the fact that the relaxed MP is easier to solve, in consequence, we generate a greater
number of cut in a smaller amount of time. According to table 15, LR requires on
average about 50% more iterations while performing 36% better in terms of CPU
time (15). Another explanation to LR performances is that more decision variables
covered at each iteration. Indeed relaxing the integrality constraint in MP allow the
decision variable yj1 associated to open a facility to can take any real value between
0 and 1. This directly impact the xed cost associated to a facility j1 equals to
fj1  yj1 and its capacity equals to j1  yj1. In consequence, we can choose the
capacity we need for a facility and at the same time reduce the cost associated, which
encourage the designer to open more facilities closer to the customer. As a result,
the relaxed MP solution contains more non zero value for the vector y, then SP
provides tighter coecient for those non zero values, thus the Bender cut generated
covers more variables. As Saharidis and Ierapetritou, 2010 emphasizes it is important
for the Bender Decomposition to cover more decision variables to better restrict the
solution space of the decomposed problems.
The SVI algorithm performances are similar to the LR algorithm, meaning that
the inequalities generated do not improve the eciency of this algorithm signicantly
on the problem studied. We only observe on average 1% improvement in terms of
CPU time compared to LR. We believe that this is due to the emergency facility
contained in the problem. Indeed because of this emergency facility, every Type-I
SVI will imply that at least one facility is open and the emergency facility is always
the best candidate because it is inexpensive. On top of that it is not always possible
to nd a lifted Type-I SVI, therefore some iteration results in weak SVI. On the other
hand, MW demonstrates a good improvement in reducing both the CPU time (54.1%
average CPU time reduction) and the number of iteration (9.1% average number of
iteration reduction).
5.2.2 Comparison of Bounds
When the problem is solved with an -optimal solution while  = 0:05, we obtain
very good overall bounds. Table 18 outline the average performance regarding the
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rho % % s % % s % % s % % s
P0 0.99 0.0 0.0 6 10 0.0 0.0 7 27 0.0 0.0 7 18 0.0 0.0 7 25
0.90 0.7 0.1 31 31 1.7 0.2 24 41 0.8 0.1 25 35 0.0 0.0 32 49
0.80 4.5 0.8 105 56 3.4 0.6 88 83 3.2 0.6 60 46 0.2 0.0 165 97
P1 0.99 0.0 0.0 5 7 0.0 0.0 4 19 0.0 0.0 5 15 0.0 0.0 4 17
0.90 0.9 0.1 30 22 0.0 0.0 26 47 0.0 0.0 14 23 1.0 0.2 23 40
0.80 3.4 0.8 115 43 2.8 0.6 84 64 1.4 0.3 69 40 2.4 0.5 85 68
P2 0.99 0.0 0.0 84 36 0.0 0.0 36 38 0.0 0.0 34 27 0.0 0.0 48 37
0.90 3.5 0.3 291 98 3.5 0.3 147 79 4.1 0.4 66 47 3.6 0.3 113 75
0.80 4.6 0.8 570 134 3.6 0.7 275 109 0.9 0.2 125 54 4.9 0.9 205 87
P3 0.99 0.0 0.0 3 9 0.9 0.0 5 25 4.8 0.1 5 14 1.4 0.0 7 34
0.90 0.0 0.0 102 54 3.8 0.4 45 55 4.4 0.4 27 31 2.3 0.2 38 62
0.80 1.6 0.3 175 82 4.9 0.9 80 77 1.0 0.2 44 38 3.4 0.6 109 78
P4 0.99 2.1 0.1 8 6 0.0 0.0 12 29 0.0 0.0 15 22 0.0 0.0 12 25
0.90 4.2 0.5 74 33 4.0 0.4 43 62 3.0 0.3 29 37 1.0 0.1 40 52
0.80 4.2 0.9 160 59 1.5 0.3 87 89 1.6 0.3 74 49 1.0 0.2 159 100
Table 16: 49-node experimental results
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rho % % s % % s % % s % % s
P5 0.99 0.6 0.0 26 23 0.0 0.0 29 8 0.3 0.0 26 12 0.0 0.0 34 20
0.90 2.1 0.2 469 73 4.0 0.4 1,519 73 2.5 0.3 459 42 5.0 0.6 520 73
0.80 3.5 0.6 5,346 133 4.0 0.7 4,863 105 5.0 0.9 2,225 64 19.1 1.0 7,219 135
P6 0.99 3.3 0.0 23 29 0.0 0.0 83 16 0.0 0.0 26 15 4.0 0.1 21 24
0.90 0.4 0.0 820 82 3.3 0.3 1,012 55 4.7 0.5 230 36 2.1 0.2 587 80
0.80 4.2 0.8 2,221 102 4.3 0.8 2,415 72 2.2 0.4 1,883 69 3.9 0.7 1,253 90
P7 0.99 0.0 0.0 117 28 0.0 0.0 170 16 0.0 0.0 90 22 0.0 0.0 135 27
0.90 1.8 0.2 2,463 105 4.1 0.6 4,600 99 4.5 0.6 1,289 48 4.6 0.6 2,053 93
0.80 10.3 8.9 7,395 128 28.2 5.4 7,341 90 42.0 2.6 7,262 79 42.9 2.0 7,275 115
P8 0.99 0.0 0.0 30 28 0.0 0.0 27 11 0.0 0.0 32 21 0.0 0.0 28 27
0.90 4.0 0.4 296 74 0.0 0.0 564 41 0.0 0.0 287 39 0.0 0.0 305 70
0.80 49.6 7.0 7,326 141 2.4 0.2 7,277 116 4.3 0.9 877 54 0.0 0.0 3,741 133
P9 0.99 0.1 0.0 83 35 0.0 0.0 144 18 0.1 0.0 58 22 0.1 0.0 53 31
0.90 3.9 0.4 1,438 102 1.2 0.1 2,531 77 1.1 0.1 827 59 1.0 0.1 932 83
0.80 19.6 7.7 7,397 142 26.0 2.7 7,318 117 0.4 0.1 7,239 96 15.7 1.1 7,224 142
Table 17: 88-node experimental results
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optimality gap and the overall gap for instances of the same size and value  for each
of the tested algorithms. All that dataset are solved to optimality except for three
cases for 88-node and  = 0:8, therefore for the problem solve to optimality Table
18 shows that the average overall gap is less than 1% even though the optimality
tolerance of the Bender decomposition is 5%.
Bender Gap Overall Gap
BD LR MW SVI BD LR MW SVI
cities rho % % % % % % % %
49 0.8 3.6 3.3 1.6 2.4 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.5
0.9 1.9 2.6 2.4 1.6 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2
0.99 0.4 0.2 1.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
88 0.8 13.0 17.4 10.8 16.3 2.0 5.0 1.0 1.0
0.9 2.5 2.4 2.6 2.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
0.99 0.0 0.8 0.1 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Table 18: Bender Optimality Gap and Overall Gap
Of the three problems not solved to optimality by BD (cf. problem P7, P8, P9 )
even though the bender gap seems important (up to 49 %), once again the overall
gap is very good (less than 5%) for both improved methods. Table 19 summarize the
results in terms bound for the two problems we are discussing. We also must notice
that MW and SVI are able to solve P8 problem to optimality, and P9 can be solved
using MW.
Bender Gap Overall Gap
BD LR MW SVI BD LR MW SVI
% % % % % % % %
P7 10.3 28.2 42.0 42.9 8.9 5.4 2.6 2.0
P8 49.6 2.4 4.3 0.0 7.0 0.2 0.9 0.0
P9 19.6 26.0 0.4 15.7 7.7 2.7 0.1 1.1
Table 19: Bender Optimality Gap and Overall Gap for problems P7, P8, P9 with
 = 0:80
We saw in the previous section that the bigger , the less impact the post-
interdiction as on the objective value. As a result, it is also true that a higher
value of  help to close the overall gap even though the bender decomposition has
not yet reach optimality.
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5.2.3 Comparison of the Convergence
8 shows the convergence of the four algorithm for the problem 1277 with  = 0:8 and
B = 2, while 9 shows the same gure under a time limit of 20s . As expected, the
standard Bender decomposition perform badly in terms of closing the optimality gap.
Relaxing the integrability constraint in the master problem (LR) help the algorithm
to constantly improve the optimality gap. All methods are characterized in terms of
objective value overtime by a fast convergence under 20s and a very slow slope until
optimality is reach. We also observe that the optimality gap evolution is very chaotic
and has clearly no convergence property. This can be explained by the fact that the
restrict solution space is dene as the algorithm progresses and some poor solution in
terms of optimality gap are selected because they are not yet covered in the master
problem, therefore nothing penalize that solution to be selected yet.
We clearly see the end of the st phase (integrality relaxation of the MP) after
about 10s for the LR, SVI, and MW enhancement methods as we can see in Figure
9b. At the same time we observe a plateau on Figure 9a between 2.5s and 10s that
also correspond at end of the rst phase.
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(a) Lower Bound over Time
(b) Bender Optimality Gap over Time
Figure 8: Convergence Plot
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(a) Lower Bound over Time
(b) Bender Optimality Gap over Time




In this research, we present a model that takes into account the risk of a potential at-
tack on the classical two-echelon facility location problem. We saw that in the original
model an intelligent attack has a severe nancial impact on the distribution network.
Our model oers decisions makers a tool to design a distribution network that will
diminish the cost of distributing products after a disruptive event by investing in a
more robust network topology. In particular, the designer is given a choice on how
much importance he wishes to assign into reducing the post-interdiction cost.
We implemented a Bender Decomposition approach to address this porblem, and
we provided two accelerating approaches namely super-valid inequalities and Pareto-
optimal cut. Both solutions oer signicant CPU time decrease compared to the
standard Bender Decomposition. However, the Pareto-optimal cut generation ap-
proach is the fastest, and we recommend this technique to solve the studied problem.
We solved scenarios with 49-node and 88-node customers and potential interme-
diate facilities. The results show that an intentional attacker can quickly destabi-
lize the network,and customers may not be served by the distribution network post-
interdiction resulting in a signicant nancial loss. The formulation we developed
oers exibility concerning the weight of the post-interdiction cost in the design of a
distribution network. However, the robustness of a solution is only slightly aected by
the weight of the post-interdiction. The premium paid for designing a robust network
is recouped after a couple of days of disruption no matter the weight chosen for the
post-interdiction. On the other hand, the enemy budget is an important parameter
to consider. Anticipating the number of potential simultaneous targets is critical.
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For future work, multiple possible extensions are available given the fact that we
based this research on the most simple multi-echelon facility location problem to open
the work on this area of research that considers deterministic network interdiction on
hierarchical network design. We believe that the model and methodology studied
in this research is general enough to be extended to other classical models. A more
straightforward extension would be to look at the location and interdiction of suppliers
that have not been tackled in this study. It would also be very benecial to integrate
other types of decision which could be strongly impacted by disruptive events such




from operator import i t emgetter , a t t r g e t t e r
# f i r s t import t h e Model c l a s s from docp l e x .mp
from docplex .mp. model import Model
def DOcplex tcnip master problem (pb , rho ) :
""" I n i t i a l Two eche l on c a p a c i t a t e d network i n t e r d i c t i o n prob lem
arguments :
pb    Dic t i ona ry r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e prob lem ( see prob lem documentat ion )
"""
###################
# e x t r a c t data from the prob lem
d , f , c , a1 , a2 , I ,V1 ,V2 = i t emget t e r ( 'd ' , ' f ' , ' c ' , ' a1 ' , ' a2 ' , ' I ' , 'V1 ' , 'V2 ' ) (pb)
###################
# cr e a t e one model i n s t an c e
m = Model (name='Two eche lon capac i ta t ed f a c i l i t y l o c a t i o n ' )
###################
# Def ine v a r i a b l e s
# x ( i , j ) i s t h e f l ow go ing out o f node i to node j
X1 = f( i , j 1 ) : m. cont inuous var (name=' x1 f0g f1g ' . format ( i , j 1 ) )
for i in I for j 1 in V1g
X2 = f( j1 , j 2 ) : m. cont inuous var (name=' x2 f0g f1g ' . format ( j1 , j 2 ) )
for j 1 in V1 for j 2 in V2g
Y = f( j ) : m. b inary var (name='Y f0g ' . format ( j ) ) for j in V1g
Z = m. cont inuous var (name='Z ' )
###################
# Def ine c o n s t r a i n t s
# c on s t r a i n t #1: demande c o n s t r a i n t
for i in I :
m. add cons t ra in t (m.sum(X1 [ i , j 1 ] for j 1 in V1) >= d [ i ] , ctname=' demande %s ' % i )
# con s t r a i n t #2: Flow con s e r v a t i on c o n s t r a i n t
for j 1 in V1 :
m. add cons t ra in t (m.sum(X2 [ j1 , j 2 ] for j 2 in V2) >= m.sum(X1 [ i , j 1 ] for i in I ) , ctname='
f l ow %s ' % j1 )
# con s t r a i n t #3: Capac i ty c o n s t r a i n t on f a c i l i t y V2
for j 2 in V2 :
m. add cons t ra in t (m.sum(X2 [ j1 , j 2 ] for j 1 in V1) <= a2 [ j2 ] , ctname=' c apa l v l 2 %s ' % j2 )
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# con s t r a i n t #4: Capac i ty c o n s t r a i n t on f a c i l i t y V1
for j 1 in V1 :
m. add cons t ra in t (m.sum(X2 [ j1 , j 2 ] for j 2 in V2) <= a1 [ j1 ]  Y[ j1 ] , ctname=' c apa l v l 1 %s ' %
j1 )
###################
# Def ine Ob j e c t i v e
m. minimize (m.sum( rho  X1 [ i , j 1 ]  c [ i ] [ j 1 ] for i in I for j 1 in V1) n
+ m.sum( rho  X2 [ j1 , j 2 ]  c [ j 1 ] [ j 2 ] for j 1 in V1 for j 2 in V2) n
+ (1 rho )  Z n





from operator import i t emgetter , a t t r g e t t e r
# f i r s t import t h e Model c l a s s from docp l e x .mp
from docplex .mp. model import Model
def DOcp l ex two eche l on capac i t a t ed in t e rd i c t i on prob l em (pb ,B, dummy=False ,m dummy=10) :
""" So l v e t h e f a c i l i t y l o c a t i o n prob lem
arguments :
pb    Dic t i ona ry r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e prob lem ( see prob lem documentat ion )
B    Number o f f a c i l i t y to i n t e r d i c t
Note :
V1    Set o f open f i c i l i t y . There i s no de s i gn d e c i s i o n in t h i s prob lem
"""
###################
# e x t r a c t data from the prob lem
d , f , c , a1 , a2 , I ,V1 ,V2 , b = i t emget t e r ( 'd ' , ' f ' , ' c ' , ' a1 ' , ' a2 ' , ' I ' , 'V1 ' , 'V2 ' , 'b ' ) (pb)
Targets = V1
# dummy f a c i l i t y
i f dummy:
V1 = l i s t (V1) + [ len (V1) ]
a1 = l i s t ( a1 ) + [sum(d) ]
c temp = [ ]
for i in I :
c temp . append ( c [ i ] + [max( c [ i ] ) m dummy ] )
c temp . append ( [max( c temp [ i ] ) for i in I ] + [ 0 ] )
c = c temp
Targets = Targets [ :  1 ]
###################
# cr e a t e one model i n s t an c e
m = Model (name='Two eche lon capac i ta t ed i n t e r d i c t i o n problem ' )
###################
# Def ine v a r i a b l e s
beta = f i : m. cont inuous var (name=' beta f0g ' . format ( i ) ) for i in I g
gamma = f j 1 : m. cont inuous var (name='gamma f0g ' . format ( j 1 ) ) for j 1 in V1g
de l t a = f j 2 : m. cont inuous var (name=' d e l t a f0g ' . format ( j 2 ) ) for j 2 in V2g
Teps i lon = f j 1 : m. cont inuous var (name=' Teps i l on f0g ' . format ( j 1 ) ) for j 1 in V1g
59
T = f j 1 : m. b inary var (name='T f0g ' . format ( j 1 ) ) for j 1 in V1g
ep s i l o n = f j 1 : m. cont inuous var (name=' e p s i l o n f0g ' . format ( j 1 ) ) for j 1 in V1g
###################
# Def ine c o n s t r a i n t s
# c on s t r a i n t #1: Shadow co s t c o n s t r a i n t
for i in I :
for j 1 in V1 :
m. add cons t ra in t ( beta [ i ]   gamma[ j1 ] <= c [ i ] [ j 1 ] , ctname=' shadow cost1 %s %s ' % ( i , j 1 )
)
# con s t r a i n t #2:
for j 1 in V1 :
for j 2 in V2 :
m. add cons t ra in t (gamma[ j1 ]   de l t a [ j 2 ]   ep s i l o n [ j 1 ] <= c [ j1 ] [ j 2 ] , ctname='
shadow cost2 %s %s ' % ( j1 , j 2 ) )
# con s t r a i n t #3: I n t e r d i c t i o n budge t
m. add cons t ra in t (m.sum(b [ j 1 ]  (1   T[ j1 ] ) for j 1 in Targets ) <= B, ctname='
i n t e r d i c t i o n budg e t ' )
e p s i l o n ba r = f j 1 : 2max( c [ j 1 ] ) for j 1 in V1g
# con s t r a i n t #4: l i n e a r i s a t i o n 1
for j 1 in V1 :
m. add cons t ra in t ( Teps i lon [ j 1 ]   ep s i l o n ba r [ j 1 ]T[ j1 ] <= 0 , ctname=' l i n 1 %s ' % j1 )
# con s t r a i n t #5: l i n e a r i s a t i o n 2
for j 1 in V1 :
m. add cons t ra in t ( Teps i lon [ j 1 ]   ep s i l o n [ j 1 ] <= 0 , ctname=' l i n 2 %s ' % j1 )
# con s t r a i n t #6: l i n e a r i s a t i o n 3
for j 1 in V1 :
m. add cons t ra in t ( Teps i lon [ j 1 ]   ep s i l o n [ j 1 ]   ep s i l o n ba r [ j 1 ]T[ j1 ] >=   ep s i l o n ba r [ j 1 ] ,
ctname=' l i n 3 %s ' % j1 )
###################
# Def ine Ob j e c t i v e
m. maximize (m.sum(d [ i ] beta [ i ] for i in I ) n
  m.sum( a2 [ j 2 ] de l t a [ j 2 ] for j 2 in V2) n







from t ime i t import de f au l t t ime r as t imer
class DOcplex tcnip :
""" Generator f o r l o o p i n g over t h e bender cu t a l g o r i t hm """
def i n i t ( s e l f , pb ,B, rho ,
e p s i l o n =0.05 , max time=7200 , re lax ing m=False ,
r e l a x i n g s=False ,
debug=False , verbose=False , UB=True , kw) :
"""
pb :
d [ i ] demand o f customer i   1D array
f [ j ] c o s t o f opening f a c i l i t y j   1D array s
c [ a ] [ b ] t r a n s p o r t a t i o n c o s t be tween node a and b   2D array s
a [ j ] c a p a c i t y o f f a c i l i t y j   1D array s
b [ j ] c o s t o f d e s t r o y i n g f a c i l i t y j   1D array s
I ,V1 ,V2 s e t o f index f o r each group o f f a c i l i t y
e p s i l o n : a c c e p t a b l e o p t ima i l y gap
max time : t e rmina t e t h e a l g o r i t hm a f t e r max time ( s )
"""
s e l f . d i c t . update (kw)
s e l f . d i c t . update ( locals ( ) )
s e l f . i n i t i a l i s a t i o n ( )
def i n i t i a l i s a t i o n ( s e l f ) :
""" Create t h e prob lem """
s e l f . stop = False ; s e l f . s s t a t u s = 0 ; s e l f . m status = 0 ;
s e l f . loop = 0 ; s e l f . time = 0 ; s e l f . obj = 1 ;
s e l f . b e s t o b j e c t i v e = 0 ; s e l f . b e s t s o l u t i o n = [ ]
s e l f . b e s t s t op gab = 0 . 5 ; s e l f . b e s t o b j e c t i v e = f loat ( ' I n f ' ) ;
s e l f . b e s t ph i = f loat ( ' I n f ' )
# Generate t h e op l prob lem wi th Docp lex
m prob = pkg . DOcplex tcnip master problem ( s e l f . pb , s e l f . rho )
s prob = pkg . DOcp l ex two eche l on capac i t a t ed in t e rd i c t i on prob l em ( s e l f . pb , s e l f .B)
# Write t h e op l
m prob . e xpo r t a s l p ( ' temp DOcplex tcnip m prob . lp ' )
s prob . e xpo r t a s l p ( ' temp DOcplex tcnip s prob . lp ' )
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# Create Cplex o b j e c t
s e l f . m prob = cplex . Cplex ( ' temp DOcplex tcnip m prob . lp ' )
s e l f . s prob = cplex . Cplex ( ' temp DOcplex tcnip s prob . lp ' )
# Turn on/ o f f Cplex l o g ( a c t i v a t e d t h e l o g w i l l r educe t h e speed o f t h e a l g o r i t hm )
i f not s e l f . verbose :
s e l f . m prob . s e t l o g s t r e am (None ) ; s e l f . s prob . s e t l o g s t r e am (None )
s e l f . m prob . s e t e r r o r s t r e am (None ) ; s e l f . s prob . s e t e r r o r s t r e am (None )
s e l f . m prob . se t warn ing s t ream (None ) ; s e l f . s prob . se t warn ing s t ream (None )
s e l f . m prob . s e t r e s u l t s s t r e am (None ) ; s e l f . s prob . s e t r e s u l t s s t r e am (None )
# need to use t r a d i t i o n a l branch and cu t to a l l ow f o r c o n t r o l c a l l b a c k s
s e l f . m prob . parameters . mip . s t r a t egy . search . set (
s e l f . m prob . parameters . mip . s t r a t egy . search . va lues . t r a d i t i o n a l )
# The prob lem w i l l be s o l v e d s e v e r a l t imes , so turn o f f advanced s t a r t
s e l f . m prob . parameters . advance . set (0 )
s e l f . s prob . parameters . advance . set (0 )
# We want to p r e v en t t h e branch and cu t to consume to much t ime
s e l f . s prob . parameters . t ime l im i t . set ( s e l f . max time / 10)
s e l f . m prob . parameters . t ime l im i t . set ( s e l f . max time / 10)
i f s e l f . r e lax ing m :
###Re lax ing t h e i n t e g r a l i t y c o n s t r a i n t
# Keeping t h e in f o rma t i on on i n t e g r a l i t y o f some v a r i a b l e s might a l l ow the
# MIP p r e s o l v e to f i x some v a r i a b l e or t i g t h e n the bounds o f some
v a r i a b l e s
# Also i f cu t g en e r a t i on i s k ep t a c t i v e , new cu t s w i l l be added to t h e roo t node .
# A l l t h a t w i l l a l l ow you to g e t a t i g h t e r ( t hu s b e t t e r ) r e l a x a t i o n o f your MIP.
s e l f . m prob . parameters . mip . t o l e r an c e s . i n t e g r a l i t y . set ( 0 . 5 )
s e l f . phase2 = False
i f s e l f . r e l a x i n g s :
s e l f . s prob . parameters . mip . t o l e r an c e s . i n t e g r a l i t y . set ( 0 . 5 )
s e l f . phase2 = False
i f not s e l f . r e lax ing m and not s e l f . r e l a x i n g s :
s e l f . phase2 = True
#### Algor i thm Step s ####
def add bender cut ( s e l f ) :
""" Add cu t to t h e master prob lem """
s e l f . bdc r = [ s e l f . pb [ ' a1 ' ] [ j 1 ]  n
s e l f . s prob . s o l u t i o n . g e t va l u e s ( ' Teps i l on %s ' %j1 )
for j 1 in s e l f . pb [ 'V1 ' ] ]
s e l f . bdc rhs = sum ( [ s e l f . pb [ 'd ' ] [ i ]  n
s e l f . s prob . s o l u t i o n . g e t va l u e s ( ' beta f0g ' . format (
i ) )
for i in s e l f . pb [ ' I ' ] ] ) n
  sum ( [ s e l f . pb [ ' a2 ' ] [ j 2 ] s e l f . s prob . s o l u t i o n . g e t va l u e s ( ' d e l t a f0g ' . format (
j 2 ) )
for j 2 in s e l f . pb [ 'V2 ' ] ] )
cut = f
" l i n e xp r " : [ cp lex . SparsePair ( ind = [ "Z" ] + [ "Y %s" % j1 for j 1 in s e l f . pb [ 'V1 ' ] ] ,
va l = [ 1 ] + s e l f . bdc r ) ] ,
" s en s e s " : [ "G" ] ,
" rhs " : [ s e l f . bdc rhs ]
g
s e l f . m prob . l i n e a r c o n s t r a i n t s . add ( l i n e xp r=cut [ " l i n e xp r " ] ,
s en s e s=cut [ " s en s e s " ] ,
rhs=cut [ " rhs " ] )
def step1 ( s e l f ) :
""" So l v e master prob lem """
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# pro c e s s i n g
s t a r t = timer ( )
s e l f . m prob . s o l v e ( )
end = timer ( )
# post p r o c e s s i n g
s e l f . F1 = s e l f . m prob . s o l u t i o n . g e t va l u e s (
[ 'Y %s ' % j1 for j 1 in s e l f . pb [ 'V1 ' ] ] )
# Update t h e Sub prob lem o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n
s e l f . s prob . ob j e c t i v e . s e t l i n e a r (
[ ( " Teps i l on %s" % j1 ,  s e l f . pb [ ' a1 ' ] [ j 1 ] item ) for j1 , item in enumerate ( s e l f . F1) ] )
return end   s t a r t
def step2 ( s e l f ) :
""" So l v e sub prob lem """
# p r o c e s s i n g
s t a r t = timer ( )
s e l f . s prob . s o l v e ( )
end = timer ( )
return end   s t a r t
def step3 ( s e l f ) :
""" Summary/ Repor t ing """
s e l f . loop += 1
s e l f . s s t a t u s = s e l f . s prob . s o l u t i o n . g e t s t a t u s ( )
s e l f . m status = s e l f . m prob . s o l u t i o n . g e t s t a t u s ( )
# S t a t s
s e l f . obj = s e l f . m prob . s o l u t i o n . g e t o b j e c t i v e v a l u e ( )
s e l f . Z = s e l f . m prob . s o l u t i o n . g e t va l u e s ( 'Z ' )
s e l f . phi = s e l f . s prob . s o l u t i o n . g e t o b j e c t i v e v a l u e ( )
s e l f . f i x e d c o s t = sum( s e l f . pb [ ' f ' ] [ j 1 ]  item for j1 , item in enumerate ( s e l f . F1) )
s e l f . p s i = ( s e l f . obj   s e l f . f i x e d c o s t   (1  s e l f . rho )  s e l f . phi ) / s e l f . rho
s e l f . s o l u t i o n = [ j1 for j1 , item in enumerate ( s e l f . F1) i f item > 0 . 5 ]
# Stop ing c r a t e r i a s
s e l f . s top gab = abs (1   s e l f . Z / s e l f . phi )
s e l f . stop = s e l f . stop or s e l f . s top gab < s e l f . e p s i l o n or s e l f . time > s e l f . max time
# Terminat ing LP r e l a x a t i o n
i f s e l f . stop and not s e l f . phase2 :
s e l f . stop = False
s e l f . phase2 = True
s e l f . m prob . parameters . mip . t o l e r an c e s . i n t e g r a l i t y . set (0 . 00001)
s e l f . s prob . parameters . mip . t o l e r an c e s . i n t e g r a l i t y . set (0 . 00001)
s e l f . r epor t [ "LR i t e r . " ] = s e l f . loop
i f s e l f . debug :
print ( "    MIP    " )
#Summary
r epor t = f
" i t e r a t i o n " : s e l f . loop ,
" ob j e c t i v e " : s e l f . obj ,
" s o l u t i o n " : s e l f . s o lu t i on ,
' cpu time ' : s e l f . time ,
" opt ima l i ty gap" : s e l f . stop gab ,
g
i f s e l f . debug : # d e t a i l s
r epor t . update (f
" p s i " : s e l f . ps i ,
" phi " : s e l f . phi ,
" Z phi " : s e l f . Z ,
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" f i x e d c o s t " : s e l f . f i x e d c o s t ,
" t ime s " : s e l f . t ime s ,
"time m" : s e l f . time m ,
g)
r epor t . update (f
" o v e r a l l UB" : s e l f . b e s t ob j e c t i v e ,
" o v e r a l l LB" : s e l f . obj ,
" o v e r a l l gap" : abs ( ( s e l f . b e s t o b j e c t i v e / s e l f . obj )   1) ,
"Phase" : 2 i f s e l f . phase2 else 1
g)
return r epor t
#### Co l l e c t i n g In f o ####
def ge t Teps i l on ( s e l f ) :
return [ s e l f . s prob . s o l u t i o n . g e t va l u e s ( ' Teps i l on %s ' %j1 )
for j 1 in s e l f . pb [ 'V1 ' ] ]
def ge t be ta ( s e l f ) :
return [ s e l f . s prob . s o l u t i o n . g e t va l u e s ( ' beta %i ' % i )
for i in s e l f . pb [ ' I ' ] ]
def g e t d e l t a ( s e l f ) :
return [ s e l f . s prob . s o l u t i o n . g e t va l u e s ( ' d e l t a %j2 ' % j2 )
for j 2 in s e l f . pb [ 'V2 ' ] ]
def s a v e b e s t s o l u t i o n ( s e l f ) :
""" Ca l c u l a t e an Upper bound f o r Master o f we o b t a i n a b e t t e r Upper bound
f o r t h e Subproblem """
# I f t h e Algor i thm doesn ` t t e rmina t e we want a good approx imate s o l u t i o n
# On top o f t h a t t h e DOcp l e x t c n i p o b j i s ve ry f a s t t o s o l v e
i f s e l f . phi < s e l f . b e s t ph i : # min SP => a c t u a l < b e s t
psi , phi , f i x e d c o s t = pkg . DOcplex tcnip obj ( s e l f . pb , s e l f . s o lu t i on , s e l f .B, l og output=
False )
i f ps i i s not None :
ob j e c t i v e = s e l f . rho  ps i + (1  s e l f . rho )phi + f i x e d c o s t
i f ob j e c t i v e < s e l f . b e s t o b j e c t i v e : #b e t t e r UB => a c t u a l < b e s t
s e l f . best gab = abs (1   ( ob j e c t i v e / s e l f . obj ) )
s e l f . b e s t s o l u t i o n = s e l f . s o l u t i o n
s e l f . b e s t o b j e c t i v e = ob j e c t i v e
s e l f . b e s t ph i = s e l f . phi
#### I t e r a t i o n Log ic ####
def terminate ( s e l f ) :
i f s e l f . time > s e l f . max time : #time out
s e l f . r epor t [ " ob j e c t i v e " ] = s e l f . b e s t o b j e c t i v e
s e l f . r epor t [ " s o l u t i o n " ] = s e l f . b e s t s o l u t i o n
# Ove r a l l LB UB and gap
# Note : r e q u i r e s a v e b e s t s o l u t i o n to be c a l l e d to opdate bounds
s e l f . r epor t [ " o v e r a l l gap" ] = abs ( ( s e l f . b e s t o b j e c t i v e / s e l f . obj )   1)
s e l f . r epor t [ " o v e r a l l UB" ] = s e l f . b e s t o b j e c t i v e
s e l f . r epor t [ " o v e r a l l LB" ] = s e l f . obj
# Bender LB UB and gap
s e l f . r epor t [ "BD gap" ] = s e l f . s top gab
s e l f . r epor t [ "BD UB" ] = s e l f . phi
s e l f . r epor t [ "BD LB" ] = s e l f . Z
# Problem parameters
s e l f . r epor t [ "B" ] = s e l f .B
s e l f . r epor t [ " rho" ] = s e l f . rho
return s e l f . r epor t
def run ( s e l f ) :
""" Generetor f o r i t e r a t i n g over t h e prob lem """
#s e l f . i n i t i a l i s a t i o n ( )
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while (not s e l f . stop ) :
s e l f . s tep ( )
y i e l d s e l f . r epor t
s e l f . terminate ( )
y i e l d s e l f . r epor t
def s tep ( s e l f ) :
# Bender
s e l f . temp obj = s e l f . obj
s e l f . time m = s e l f . s tep1 ( )
s e l f . t ime s = s e l f . s tep2 ( )
# Repor t ing
s e l f . time += s e l f . time m + s e l f . t ime s
s e l f . r epor t = s e l f . s tep3 ( )
s e l f . add bender cut ( )







class DOcplex tcnip 2 ( pkg . DOcplex tcnip ) :
def i n i t i a l i s a t i o n ( s e l f ) :
"""Add i n i t i a l i s a t i o n r e l a t i v e to SVI"""
s e l f . best LB Z = 0 ; s e l f . nb r sv i = 0 ; s e l f . UB phi = 0 ;
super ( ) . i n i t i a l i s a t i o n ( )
def add SVI ( s e l f ) :
"""The Post i n t e r d i c t i o n must be a t l e a s t e qua l t o t h e pre i n t e r d i c t i o n c o s t """
LB Z = s e l f . obj   s e l f . f i x e d c o s t
### SVI 1
# Add the cu t on l y i f i t f u r t h e r c on s t r a i n t h e a l g o r i t hm
i f LB Z > s e l f . best LB Z :
# Add Z s v i
cut = f
" l i n e xp r " : [ cp lex . SparsePair ( ind = [ "Z" ] ,
va l = [ 1 ] ) ] ,
" s en s e s " : [ "G" ] ,
" rhs " : [ s e l f . obj   s e l f . f i x e d c o s t ]
g
s e l f . nb r sv i += 1
s e l f . r epor t [ " s v i " ] = s e l f . obj   s e l f . f i x e d c o s t
s e l f . m prob . l i n e a r c o n s t r a i n t s . add ( l i n e xp r=cut [ " l i n e xp r " ] , s en s e s=cut [ " s en s e s " ] , rhs=
cut [ " rhs " ] )
### SVI 2
# Add the cu t on l y i f i t f u r t h e r c on s t r a i n t h e a l g o r i t hm
# l i f t i n g procedure
r = sorted ( s e l f . bdc r , r e v e r s e=True )
for i in range (1 , len ( s e l f . pb [ "V1" ] ) ) :
i f s e l f . bdc rhs   sum( r [ : i ] )   s e l f . phi < 0 :
break
cut = f
" l i n e xp r " : [ cp lex . SparsePair ( ind = [ "Y %s" % j1 for j 1 in s e l f . pb [ 'V1 ' ] ] ,
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va l = [1 i f Teps i lon > 0 else 0 for Teps i lon in s e l f .
g e t Teps i l on ( ) ] ) ] ,
" s en s e s " : [ "G" ] ,
" rhs " : [ i ]
g
s e l f . m prob . l i n e a r c o n s t r a i n t s . add ( l i n e xp r=cut [ " l i n e xp r " ] , s en s e s=cut [ " s en s e s " ] , rhs=cut [
" rhs " ] )
def s tep ( s e l f ) :
super ( ) . s tep ( )
# SVI
s e l f . add SVI ( )
i f s e l f . debug :
s e l f . r epor t [ " nb r sv i " ] = s e l f . nb r sv i
return s e l f . r epor t
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Appendix E
Bender Decomposition and Pareto
Optimal Cut Algorithm
%%f i l e " . / pkg/DOcplex tcnip 3 . py"
import pkg
import cp lex
from t ime i t import de f au l t t ime r as t imer
class DOcplex tcnip 3 ( pkg . DOcplex tcnip ) :
def i n i t i a l i s a t i o n ( s e l f ) :
super ( ) . i n i t i a l i s a t i o n ( )
s e l f .mw = True ; s e l f . mw cut = 0
def step mw ( s e l f ) :
""" So l v e independant Magnanti Wong Problem """
# Update core po i n t
s e l f .Y0 = [ 0 . 5  s e l f .Y0 [ j1 ] + 0 .5  s e l f . F1 [ j 1 ] for j 1 in s e l f . pb [ "V1" ] ]
# Update Ob j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n
s e l f . s prob . ob j e c t i v e . s e t l i n e a r (
[ ( " Teps i l on %s" % j1 ,  s e l f . pb [ ' a1 ' ] [ j 1 ] s e l f .Y0 [ j1 ] ) for j 1 in s e l f . pb [ "V1" ] ] )
# pro c e s s i n g
s t a r t = timer ( )
s e l f . s prob . s o l v e ( )
s e l f . s s t a t u s = s e l f . m prob . s o l u t i o n . g e t s t a t u s ( )
# cu t s
cut = f
" l i n e xp r " : [ cp lex . SparsePair ( ind = [ "Z" ] + [ "Y %s" % j1 for j 1 in s e l f . pb [ 'V1 ' ] ] ,
va l = [ 1 ] + [ s e l f . pb [ ' a1 ' ] [ j 1 ] s e l f . s prob . s o l u t i o n .
g e t va l u e s ( ' Teps i l on %s ' %j1 )
for j 1 in s e l f . pb [ 'V1 ' ] ] ) ] ,
" s en s e s " : [ "G" ] ,
" rhs " : [sum ( [ s e l f . pb [ 'd ' ] [ i ] s e l f . s prob . s o l u t i o n . g e t va l u e s ( ' beta f0g ' . format ( i )
)
for i in s e l f . pb [ ' I ' ] ] ) n
  sum ( [ s e l f . pb [ ' a2 ' ] [ j 2 ] s e l f . s prob . s o l u t i o n . g e t va l u e s ( ' d e l t a f0g ' .
format ( j 2 ) )
for j 2 in s e l f . pb [ 'V2 ' ] ] ) ]
g
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s e l f . m prob . l i n e a r c o n s t r a i n t s . add ( l i n e xp r=cut [ " l i n e xp r " ] , s en s e s=cut [ " s en s e s " ] , rhs=cut [
" rhs " ] )
end = timer ( )
return end   s t a r t
def s tep ( s e l f ) :
# Magnati Wong
i f s e l f . loop i s not 0 and s e l f .mw:
s e l f . time mw = s e l f . step mw ()
s e l f . mw cut += 1
else :
s e l f . time mw = 0
s e l f . obj = 1
s e l f . time += s e l f . time mw
super ( ) . s tep ( )
#debug
i f s e l f . debug :
s e l f . r epor t [ "time mw" ] = s e l f . time mw
s e l f . r epor t [ "mw cut" ] = s e l f . mw cut
#Improvement
i f s e l f . loop i s 1 :
s e l f .Y0 = l i s t ( s e l f . F1)
#Amel io ra t i on o f s o l u t i o n i f s l ow improvement
# i f abs (1   s e l f . o b j / s e l f . t emp ob j ) < 0 . 0 1 : # no e v o l u t i o n in t h e o b j
# t o l e r a n c e s = s e l f . m prob . parameters . mip . t o l e r a n c e s . i n t e g r a l i t y . g e t ( )
# i f t o l e r a n c e s > 0 . 00001 :
# s e l f . m prob . parameters . mip . t o l e r a n c e s . i n t e g r a l i t y . s e t (
# t o l e r a n c e s / 2
# )
return s e l f . r epor t
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